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Supermajoritarianism
and the American Criminal Jury
by ETHAN J. LEIB*
I. Introduction
In Apodaca v. Oregon' and Johnson v. Louisiana,' the Supreme
Court allowed the relaxation of the decision rule most commonly
associated with criminal jury felony verdicts and held that unanimity
in state criminal cases is not constitutionally required. The Court
announced that states were allowed to use 10-2 and 9-3 verdicts in
non-capital state cases in contravention of the traditional rule
requiring unanimity.3 The Court argued that the essential function of
the jury is to place between the accused and the state a commonsense
group of laymen representing a cross-section of the community-and
that relaxation of the unanimity requirement would not upset that
function. Moreover, the Court argued that since elimination of
unanimity was unlikely to affect the reliability of verdicts, the
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Yale. I thank Owen Fiss, Arend Lijphart, Troy McKenzie, Eric Zolt, William Rubenstein,
Eleanor Swift, Shari Seidman Diamond, Stuart Chinn, and participants in a faculty
colloquium at the University of California, Davis for comments on earlier drafts;
correspondences with John McGinnis, Ian Shapiro, Kevin Johnson, Donna Shestowsky,
Bruce Ackerman, and Saul Levmore were also helpful in thinking through some of the
ideas presented here.
1. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
2. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
3. The unanimity requirement dates to 1367. In the 17th century, American colonies
allowed majority rule, but by the 18th century it was widely understood that verdicts
needed to be unanimous. See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY
SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 179 (2000) (1994) (citing FREDERICK
POLLACK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, 2 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 626 (1959);
FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 16-18 (1951); Anonymous Case, 41 LIB.
ASSISARUM 11 (1367); Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 408 n. 3). Federal rules now allow non-
unanimous supermajority verdicts but only by mutual consent of the parties; defendants
rarely consent. See FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 31(a).
[141]
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representativeness of the jury pool, or the deliberation in the jury
room (because the majority would still need to convince the minority
bloc), the Court blessed the state rules. From the perspective of
practice, however, Oregon and Louisiana are the only states that
allow felony convictions without juror unanimity (though many states
now have a corollary to the federal rule, where mutual consent of the
government and the defendant can relax the rule).5 While the Court
has enabled experimentation with decision rules, most states remain
committed to unanimity as the proper decision rule for the criminal
jury; little experimentation is afoot domestically.
Why the obsession with unanimity here-and why is that the
baseline decision rule when almost no other decision in public
political life gets made by unanimous consent? Indeed, unanimity's
hold upon us is so great that we require it for acquittals too: not only
do we require complete agreement to convict a defendant but we also
require all jurors to agree to acquit one. So much for the
presumption of innocence or the idea that the unanimity requirement
places the burden of proof completely upon the state. I argue here
that supermajority decision rules would be more appropriate than
unanimity or majority rule for criminal jury convictions and that
majority decision rules would be more appropriate than either
unanimity or supermajoritarian rules for acquittals. This hybrid
decision rule is new to the conversation about acceptable
permutations of decision rules in the American criminal jury context
and it should command widespread support.
Many of the possible historical reasons for the unanimity
requirement are ones that are substantially less persuasive now-and
the Court itself has recognized this. If unanimity developed at
common law "to compensate for the lack of other rules insuring that a
defendant received a fair trial,"6 American criminal procedure now
has many more substantial protections for defendants. Another
theory of unanimity's etiology is that unanimity "arose out of the
practice in the ancient mode of trial by compurgation of adding to the
4. Unanimity in federal criminal cases is still protected by statute, FED. R. CRIM.
PROC. 31(a), though the logic for this differential application of decision rules as between
state and federal courts is hard to explain theoretically.
5. See DAVID ROTrMAN ET AL., STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, table 42
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000) (providing complete information on
verdict rules on a state-by-state basis).
6. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2 (citing L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM
ARREST TO APPEAL 347-351 (1947); Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal
Cases, 21 Miss. L.J. 185, 191 (1950)).
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original number of 12 compurgators until one party had 12
compurgators supporting his position; the argument is that when this
technique of afforcement was abandoned, the requirement that one
side obtain the votes of all 12 jurors remained."7  If this is right,
compurgation-an ancient method of trial where certain kinds of
witnesses essentially became jurors-has very little relevance to
contemporary trials, where we'd never allow a witness on the jury;
accordingly, we should have no allegiance to a decision rule that arose
out of a jury practice that has so little to do with our own. If the
unanimity requirement arose out of the medieval idea that reasonable
people cannot disagree and that minority jurors must be lying, we
must certainly abandon it in our pluralistic society.8
Still, many wish to retain unanimity because it seems to furnish a
security in outcome-even though the security is arguably a false one.
Unlike in political decisions where 'truth' is rarely at issue, the truth
about what a defendant actually did matters a great deal in the
criminal jury and may counsel for a different decision rule from that
endorsed in political life more generally: sending a person to jail or to
death row is a big deal and unanimity provides at least the surface
appearance of certainty, conferring legitimacy upon the criminal
justice system to those who view it from the outside.9
7. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2 (citing P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 48-49 (1956);
Ryan, Less than Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 58 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 211,
213 (1967)).
8. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407,407 n.2,408.
9. States are much more willing to experiment with non-unanimous verdicts in civil
trials, where presumably less is at stake. I do not discuss civil juries here; my only concern
in this Article is the criminal jury. Just for contrast, "[t]wenty-one states, the District of
Columbia, and federal courts require unanimous verdicts in all civil cases, while 29 states
require a supermajority." National Center for State Courts, Jury Decision-Making FAQs,
available at http://www.ncsconline.orgfWC/FAQs/JurDecFAQ.htm (last modified on July
18, 2005). Thus, supermajoritarianism is the rule in civil juries.
It is also worth noting that criminal convictions by courts martial in the United
States Armed Forces do not require unanimity (unless it is in connection with a capital
crime); they require a two-thirds supermajority. The failure of two-thirds of the jury to
reach agreement on a conviction results in a "not guilty" verdict. See Uniform Code of
Military Justice ("UCMJ"), Article 52, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 852 (2005) (requiring, inter
alia, unanimity for capital convictions and death sentences, two-thirds supermajorities for
conviction on almost all other crimes, and three-fourths supermajorities for sentences of
life imprisonment or incarceration for more than ten years); United States v. Jones, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 177, 179 (1963) ("The Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951,
paragraph 74d(3), in effect provides that there may be no 'hung jury' on the question of
guilt or innocence."). These unique decision rules may have something to do with unique
jury composition rules in the court martial context: all jury members are from the Armed
Forces so are, in a sense, pre-screened, see UCMJ, Article 25, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 825
(2005); they are chosen by a convening authority for their qualifications "by reason of age,
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Yet, there remains no obvious reason that unanimity is to be
preferred: most agree that the outcomes of verdicts do not
significantly vary with decision rule'0 and that juries decide concurrent
value questions alongside their fact-finding much of the time."
Because we almost never expect unanimity on non-trivial value
questions in our society-indeed, if everyone agreed on such values,
we'd have little use for our liberal scheme of governance-it is odd to
demand it from our criminal juries. Because the jury is routinely
conceived as a "political institution,' ' 12 a "mini-legislature,"' 3 and a
education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament," id.; and
there are few challenge opportunities, see UCMJ, Article 41, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 841
(2005) (allowing "for cause" challenges and entitling each party to a single peremptory
challenge). Thanks to Robert Don Gifford for encouraging me to explore UCMJ decision
rules.
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL SAKS, JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIZE AND
DECISION RULE (1977) (decision rule does not effect verdicts, deliberation time, or the
ability of jurors to recall testimony); Valerie P. Hans, The Power of Twelve: The Impact of
Jury Size and Unanimity on Civil Jury Decision Making, 4 DEL. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2001)
(studies "show that the overall ratio of convictions to acquittals does not differ for
unanimity and majority-rule juries"); P. D. P. Velasco, The Influence of Size and Decision
Rule in Jury Decision-Making, in PSYCHOLOGY, LAW, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 344 (G. Davies et al.
eds., 1995) (decision rule does not influence verdicts); A.M. Padawer-Singer et al., An
Experimental Study of Twelve vs. Six Member Juries Under Unanimous vs. Non-
unanimous Decisions, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 77 (B. D. Sales ed., 1977)
(decision rule does not effect verdicts); Charles Nemeth, Interaction Between Jurors of
[Super]Majority vs. Unanimity Decision Rules, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 38 (1977)
(same); Tatsuya Kameda, Procedural Influence in Small-Group Decision-Making:
Deliberation Style and Assigned Decision Rule, 61 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL.
245 (1991) (same). There is some empirical evidence to the contrary too. See Norbert L.
Kerr et al., Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned
Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL.
282 (1976) (non-unanimous jurors convict more often); R. Buckhout et al., Jury Verdicts:
Comparison of 6- vs. 12-Person Juries and Unanimous vs. Majority Decision Rule in a
Murder Trial, 10 BULL. OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SOC'Y 175 (1977) (same).
11. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 163-64 (1966)
(decision rule does not effect verdicts). Examples of value judgments often decided by
juries include: excusing defendants for contributory fault of the victim (when it is not a
legal excuse), id. at 242; excusing defendants because the harm was de minimis (even when
the law recognizes no de minimis exception), id. at 258; excusing defendants because they
are being subjected to unpopular laws, id. at 286; excusing defendants because they have
already been subjected to enough punishment, id. at 301; considering that the punishment
for a conviction is too severe, id. at 308; excusing defendants because other defendants are
getting preferential treatment, id. at 313; excusing defendants for improper conduct by the
police, id. at 318; passing judgment on the validity of excuses and justifications, id. at 329;
passing judgment on whether drunkenness should be mitigation, id. at 335; and treating
crime in subcultures differentially by applying standards appropriate (or inappropriate) to
different cultural contexts, id. at 339.
12. AKHIL REED AMAR, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, in THE
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forum for ordinary citizens to have input into political life, there may
be good reason to harmonize the jury decision rule with the decision
rules otherwise prevalent in our democratic polity. Moreover, now
that the jury pool is far more diverse than it once was, pluralism
rather than the homogeneity presumed by unanimity seems
warranted.1 4 We don't all agree about the soundness of our laws; and
it is odd to expect us all to agree that a particular individual
"deserves" to be found guilty of a certain crime. Finally, there is
evidence that the pressure for unanimous agreement can result in
preference falsification, where dissenters simply lie and go along with
a verdict or decision they do not prefer, either because they are
intimidated, they are embarrassed, they collapse from peer pressure,
or they are eager to reach a decision-any decision. 5 The pathologies
of unanimity are compounded when we consider the symmetrical
nature of the requirement: jurors in the minority-especially when
that minority is small-find themselves with little hope to turn the
verdict around. The best these jurors can hope for is a hung jury,
which leaves few people (save some defendants) very happy.
Accordingly, the somewhat puzzling persistence of the unanimity
requirement and its symmetry commands our attention. 6
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 161, 165 (1997) (1994) (citing ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273, 274 (George Lawrence trans., J.P. Mayer
ed., 1969) (13th ed., 1850) (claiming that "[t]he jury is both the most effective way of
establishing the people's rule and the most efficient way of teaching them how to rule")).
The Supreme Court thinks this aspect of the jury is important too. See, e.g., Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,155-56 (1968); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
13. WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 354-55, 357 (1994) (1875).
14. As I suggested supra note 9, the military's choice to allow non-unanimous verdicts
may be related to its relatively restricted peremptory challenge policy. Since court martial
panel membership cannot be controlled by the lawyers, pluralism likely reigns and
counsels for more relaxed decision rules.
15. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 14-38 (2003)
(noting that "people are extremely vulnerable to the unanimous views of others"); TIMUR
KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE
FALSIFICATION (1995).
16. To the extent that the preference for unanimity is bound up with the concern that
non-unanimous verdicts will appear less legitimate to citizens and other players in the
criminal justice system, it is worth noting that many countries have legitimate criminal
justice systems without unanimity; indeed, no other country has a symmetrical unanimity
requirement. More, the states that have experimented with non-unanimous verdicts have
not reverted back to the unanimity rule-and there is little evidence in those states of a
desire to return to the unanimity requirement. But see Ashbel S. Green, Experts Ponder
Crime-Issues Vote; Surprised Political Observers Say the Split Result Doesn't Indicate that
People Are Less Tough on Crime than They Used To Be, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 4, 1999,
at C1 (reporting that Oregon's "Measure 72," an initiative that asked voters to relax the
jury decision rule for murder convictions from unanimity to 11-1 verdicts, failed to garner
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Often the debates about the proper decision rules for the
criminal jury take place among social scientists, who offer either
experimental evidence-usually from mock juries of college students
where 'jurors' know that no one's fate hangs in the balance"--or
the support of the majority of the electorate despite having done so in a prior initiative
("Measure 40") passed by the voters in 1996 but struck down by the courts).
17. Rarely does the experimental design even involve the drama of a trial; mock
jurors are often asked to read evidence or watch videos of fake trials. See generally Brian
H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW &
HUM. BEHAVIOR 75 (1999) (surveying jury research design and finding that simulations
are "becoming less realistic over time"); but see Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations
and Shadows From Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 561 (1997) (remaining
optimistic about increasing sophistication in research design). To be sure, Bornstein
argues that at least with respect to the objections associated with experimental participant
demographics (participants in most jury research are college students) and the media of
presentation (most simulations are not life-like), there is some empirical and comparative
evidence suggesting that these factors do not furnish good reason to challenge the validity
of generalizing from the experimental scenario to real-life juries (to which researchers
have very limited access). But see Bornstein, supra, at 78-79, 82-83 (acknowledging that in
5 of 26 studies there were differences in results that could be traced to whether the
participants in the mock juries were students rather than adults (though emphasizing the
21 cases in which no differences could be found) and acknowledging that in 3 of 11 studies
that could be used to assess whether presentation media resulted in different verdicts,
presentational media did have an effect (though emphasizing the 8 cases where no
difference could be found)). Still, Bornstein appreciates that there are very few studies
that can be used to measure the external validity of jury simulation and that the "potential
impact of other factors, such as variations in whether or not the mock jurors deliberate
and the consequentiality of the task, require further investigation." Id. at 88. Although
his conclusions are ultimately optimistic about validity, he is up front about the limited
nature of the proof.
For Bornstein's more extended thoughts on the "consequentiality" problem-that
fake jurors only decide the fate of a fake defendant and rarely need to expend as much
time and effort as real jurors-see Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jury
Decisionmaking: Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of Consequentiality in Jury Simulation
Research, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV. 443 (2005) (surveying five "consequentiality" studies, three
of which involved no deliberation, and concluding that the studies are indeterminate but
that "consequentiality" can affect outcome, participants' memory of evidence, and internal
decision-making processes); see also id. at 460 (suggesting that "consequentiality" may be
somewhat more relevant in the criminal rather than civil context).
On the other hand, we are starting to get new data on real civil juries. See Shari
Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, & Beth Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement:
The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 201 (2006). Still, this
data has somewhat limited value for the study of the criminal jury; and Diamond and her
co-authors acknowledge as much. See id. at 208-10.
I should make clear that I do not wish to denigrate empirical work on the jury-
and find much of it instructive and useful. Indeed, when I turn to summarizing some of
the reasons others offer for their views about decision rule policy, I draw upon empirical
evidence. See generally Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of
Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 622 (2001)
(reviewing the empirical literature on juries, summarizing findings of 11 studies that
specifically focus upon decision rules, and concluding that "juries not required to be
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formal models-using unverified assumptions--to argue for
particular permutations of rules. More central to my approach here is
how proposed rules for the criminal jury link up with democratic
political theory more generally-and how the decision rule for the
jury can be made sense of in light of the political decision rules of the
society in which the criminal jury finds itself. In the case of the
United States, there is a clear disjunct between our general
democratic decision rules and our criminal jury decision rules: we
tend to remain committed to unanimity in the context of the jury but
we seem to use majority rule for major political decisions, on our
Courts of Appeals, and on our Supreme Court. Americans use
seemingly majoritarian procedures to settle hotly contested questions
of value; resort to such an extreme rule as unanimity is virtually
unprecedented in American political life.
Yet, I argue here that taking simple majoritarianism as the
baseline in American society would also be an error. I argue instead
that supermajoritarianism is far more entrenched in our political and
constitutional culture than is usually assumed, and that a
supermajority rule for conviction by criminal juries makes sense
against this background. Once I can show that the unanimity rule's
anomaly is not that it isn't majoritarian but that it isn't
supermajoritarian, I can provide more support for the argument to
relax the unanimity requirement, harmonizing the jury decision rule
with the political theory of American constitutional decision rules
unanimous tend to take less time to reach a verdict, take fewer polls, and hang less often.
Juries also tend to cease deliberating when a quorum is reached, and jurors serving on
juries required to reach unanimous verdicts have tended to report being more satisfied
and confident that the jury reached the correct verdict. Conversely, several studies have
found little or no impact of assigned decision rule, but these studies tend to have obvious
methodological weaknesses such as little or no variance in jury verdicts, severe
deliberation time limits, and small samples. Although decision rule effects appear to be
small but real, they are also likely to be contingent on other factors, such as the strength of
the evidence.") (citations omitted). But it remains true that researchers have very little
access to actual jurors and actual juror deliberation-and claims about what might happen
under a particular decision rule are invariably speculative to some extent. See id. at 698
(acknowledging that assigned jury decision rule is not a major variable "with sizable
effects on jury decision outcomes"). Indeed, especially so in my case because the hybrid
decision rule I ultimately endorse has not been empirically tested as far as I know.
Although she probably continues to disagree with my use of and attitude toward
empirical work, I thank Donna Shestowsky for instruction and conversation about the
empirical study of juror decision-making.
18. See, e.g., Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Convicting the Innocent:
The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts Under Strategic Voting, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
23 (1998) (assuming strategic voting-i.e., that jurors only care about a case if their vote
can make a difference to the outcome).
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more generally. I offer a "coherentist" argument for a supermajority
jury decision rule for conviction, which is primarily meant to be a
"thumb on the scales": I do not mean for this account to be a slam-
dunk argument for supermajoritarian rules all the time, only for it to
shift the burden back onto those that favor unanimity and
majoritarian rules. But do not think this is merely a positive or
descriptive account; there is normative force to the argument for
supermajoritarianism in particular institutional contexts-and I hope
to show why the criminal jury is one such institution that should be
harmonized with the more general (and principled) preference in
American political theory for supermajoritarian decision rules.
In the case of acquittals, however, I reject requiring high degrees
of consensus above the majority threshold so that we can (1) give due
respect for the presumption of innocence, (2) lower the number of
hung juries, and (3) incentivize deliberation. By lowering the number
of jurors the minority (presumptively for acquittal)' 9 must convince to
get its desired verdict during the deliberation stage, we are most likely
to encourage members of the minority to try to convince a few jurors
in the supermajority (presumptively for conviction) to achieve their
verdict preference. If a small superminority had to convince a full
supermajority to get its desired result, the members of the minority
would much more likely keep quiet and would not have many
incentives to participate in deliberation; as soon as they see that they
are outnumbered by a supermajority, they are unlikely to believe they
can turn the verdict around. But if they only need to convince a few
jurors to get their way, they will engage fully to achieve an acquittal.
These reasons counsel us to reject supermajoritarianism in the
context of criminal jury acquittals. Given that we tend to want to give
defendants some benefit of the doubt, the symmetry of the decision
rule is as misguided as the unanimity requirement itself; it should
require fewer votes to acquit than to convict. °
19. I make this presumption because there is a 75% conviction rate, even with
unanimity rules. See National Center for State Courts, Jury Decision-Making FAQs,
available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/FAQs/JurDecFAQ.htm (last modified on July
18, 2005).
20. Although I do not intend to explore every aspect of "softening" the acquittal
decision rule from unanimity to a majority rule here, I believe a reasonable challenge
could come from within the camp of those who want acquittal verdicts to have more
meaning in our sentencing practices. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Comment, "If It Suffices
To Accuse": United States v. Watts and the Reassessment of Acquittals, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
887 (1999) (arguing that we ought to prevent judges from using acquitted conduct as a
sentencing consideration). It is certainly possible that relaxing the number of votes
needed to acquit might have effects on how an acquittal is perceived by our sentencing
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Two executive summaries-and some explanation of them-
follow before I get to the affirmative argument I wish to make. In the
first (contained in Part II), I summarize some of the advantages and
disadvantages of various decision rules as a matter of general
democratic theory. The typology is rough but provides some
guidance as to why regimes may select particular decision rules. I try
to show why different institutional contexts may recommend different
decision rules even though each can be properly considered to have
democratic credentials. In concluding Part II, I explore a common
classification from political science that distinguishes democracies
based on their preferences for particular decisional principles. This
paves the way for me to classify the United States as a regime that has
a principled preference for supermajoritarianism. Americans
generally assume that the United States is majoritarian and this has
some trying to account for how the unanimity requirement in the
criminal jury can be justified in a majoritarian regime. But by re-
conceptualizing the American regime as supermajoritarian through
and through, a supermajoritarian jury decision rule becomes easier to
accommodate-and begs the relevant question: why we don't have
supermajoritarian rules in the criminal jury context?"
regimes and society more generally. But Joh's article makes sense only because the
acquittal has been so far debased in our society that it is hard to imagine doing it more
harm: acquitted conduct shows no signs of becoming less relevant in sentencing,
notwithstanding a rigorous decision rule. I agree with Joh that there is a "communicative
function to acquittals," id. at 900, that gets undermined when acquitted conduct is used to
enhance sentences. Yet, I would still like to increase the number of acquittals for repose,
for coherence with other decision rules in our society, and for giving effect to the
presumption of innocence beyond the "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement.
Joh has also suggested (this time in person in October 2005) that one could get
even more creative with hybridizing decision rules: one might require a supermajority or
unanimity for an "innocent" verdict (one we do not currently have in the United States)
and only require a majority to get a "not guilty" verdict.
21. There is a burgeoning literature in political science trying to account for the
growth of supermajoritarian rules in the Senate's internal procedures. See, e.g., S.A.
BINDER, MINORITY RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CONGRESS (1997); David R. Mayhew, Supermajority Rule in the U.S. Senate, 36 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 31 (2003); Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional
Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (2004). As an unintended consequence of my
argument here, I provide an indirect defense of that development in Senate procedure.
My argument could also be used to help support Bruce Ackerman's recent
proposal that the "advise and consent" provisions for Senate approval of judicial nominees
be read to require a two-thirds supermajority. The advantages of such a decision rule are
obvious: the nominees would need to be centrists and garner a larger consensus. This rule
works well for Germany's appointments to its Constitutional Court, and Ackerman thinks
it could work well in the United States as well. See Bruce Ackerman, Judicial Extremism:
A German Antidote, L.A. TIMES, February 19, 2003, at B15, available at
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Moving from the general to the specific, the second executive
summary (in Part III) outlines the arguments made for various
decision rules in the context of the criminal jury. Although hardly
exhaustive, the executive summary offers a fair cross-section of the
landscape in this area. Unlike most discussions in this field, I
subdivide the summary along the dimension of a/symmetry-whether
the same vote should be required to convict as to acquit-because
that aspect of selecting the proper decision rule has been
underemphasized.
In Part IV, I offer an argument for supermajoritarian
requirements for conviction rooted in our general constitutional
commitment to supermajoritarianism. I present a coherentist account
for a supermajority rule for conviction, but ultimately endorse a
simple majority rule for acquittal: since the costs are asymmetric with
respect to conviction and acquittal, I am persuaded that such
asymmetry should be mirrored in the jury decision rule. While Akhil
Amar has made an effort to teach Americans about their Constitution
through the Bill of Rights-and especially the jury provisions
therein-I use the opposite methodology: I hope to illuminate the
criminal jury provisions of the Bill of Rights by reinforcing the
underlying structure of the Constitution as supermajoritarian.2 Part
V concludes.
H. Three Democratic Decision Rules
When taking to the task of institutional design, democrats need
to decide on a catalogue of decision rules. While many take for
granted de Tocqueville's claim that "[t]he very essence of democratic
government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority,"'
http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/Public Affairs/353/yls.article.htm. His colleague
Judith Resnik came to the idea a few months later, but got the same idea published in the
New York Times. See Judith Resnik, Supermajority Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2003,
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/htmUPublic Affairs/384/yls.article.htm. Of
course, the recent use of the filibuster in connection with President Bush's nominations to
the courts suggests that a supermajority of 60 is already needed (for cloture)-and the
argument further supports this departure from majoritarianism. For more on
supermajoritarianism as it relates to the judicial confirmation process, see John 0.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation
Process, 26 CARD. L. REV. 543 (2005); and Brent Wible, Filibuster vs. Supermajority Rule:
From Polarization to a Consensus- and Moderation-Forcing Mechanism for Judicial
Confirmations, 13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 897 (2005).
22. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
I thank Nick Daum for this methodological insight.
23. ROBERTA. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 35 (1956).
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there is considerable variation in the decision rules that can fairly be
considered democratic. If stability is a goal of a democracy, more
than mere majorities may be required, since majorities can shift very
easily. Even if majority rule is the linchpin of democracy, there is
reason to believe that the adoption of only majoritarian rules can
actually stymie the potential for majorities to rule: for example, if
popular majorities directly elect members of a parliament, and those
members use majority rule as their decision procedure, the resulting
legislative decisions may represent the preferences of a mere 25% of
the electorate.24 Another obvious reason for the democrat to desire
consent of more than a mere majority is the pathology we have come
to call the "tyranny of the majority": large segments of populations
may get oppressed at the hands of an insensitive majority, so various
forms of consociational government, where minorities are consulted
or given veto power, may be preferred to pure majoritarianism.
These results (among many others) encourage democratic designers
to consider a range of decision rules for political life.25 The executive
summary below lists some of the advantages and disadvantages of
various decision rules that can be considered democratic. While any
design choice will need to be context-specific because "the costs and
benefits of a particular institutional choice can only be properly
weighed in light of the total institutional package,"26 there are very
general things that can be said in support of and in opposition to each
rule. Here I pick only three possible decision rules,27 but they are the
24. This insight can be traced to JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861). Mill used this insight to argue for proportional
representation as the appropriate electoral system to bring about true majority rule-and
many who study electoral systems emphasize that majoritarian systems often produce
government coalitions that are not even endorsed by a plurality of voters. See, e.g., G.
Bingham Powell, Jr., Political Responsiveness and Constitutional Design, in DEMOCRACY
AND INSTITUTIONS: THE LIFE WORK OF AREND LIJPHART 9, 9 (Markus M.L. Crepaz et
al., eds., 2000) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONS].
25. In a fascinating contribution to the debate about decision rules, Adrian Vermeule
has most recently drawn our attention to "submajority rules" that exist within democratic
regimes. See Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon
Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74 (2005).
26. Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart and the New Institutionalism, in DEMOCRACY
AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 43, 54-55.
27. One could imagine a much more elaborate spectrum. See, e.g., Jack H. Nagel,
Expanding the Spectrum of Democracies: Reflections on Proportional Representation in
New Zealand, in DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 113, 119 (arguing
that the spectrum should include: Unanimity; Consensus Democracy; Supermajoritarian
Democracy; Majoritarian Democracy; Pluralitarian Democracy; Factional Rule; Elite
Rule; and Dictatorship). Still, Nagel's scale extends beyond decision rules that could fairly
be called democratic.
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three that can be considered the building blocks of more complex
democratic systems. I make an effort below the summary to explicate
the main features of the lists textually. I conclude the Part by
showing how one might classify complete regimes containing a
multitude of decision rules based on their propensity to prefer a
particular rule type.
Rule: Unanimity
Theorists and Proponents: Woldf28/ Buchanan
& Tullock29/ Mansbridge 30/ Lijphart31
Pros:
" guarantees individual autonomy against
governmental action
" contributes to legitimacy
" suppresses conflict
" focuses attention on the common good and
unity
" tries to draw minorities into coalitions and
empowers them
" elicits information with strict decision rule
" encourages deliberation to garner consensus
" actively promotes consensus
Cons:
" results in compromises no one really wants
because ideas and policies get thinned
out to garner complete agreement
" privileges the status quo
" very difficult to achieve
" very time-consuming to reach
" represses conflict excessively and may lead to
alienation, preference falsifying, and
deep-seated hostilities
28. ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970).
29. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962).
30. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1983).
31. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND
CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES (1984).
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Rule: Supermajoritarianism
Theorists and Proponents: McGinnis &
Rappaport 32/ King 33/ Mueller34/
Levmore
35
Pros:
" navigates between the advantages of other
decision rules: it enhances deliberation,
legitimacy, the common good, and
autonomy, while incentivizing coalitions
and information-revelation
" controls against easy capture by interest
groups
- promotes consensus without setting bar so
high as to allow lone holdouts to ruin it
for everyone
Cons:
- results in compromises no one really wants
because ideas and policies get thinned
out to garner substantial agreement
- privileges the status quo 36
- somewhat difficult to achieve
- may repress dissenters
- does not result in higher likelihood of "correct"
answers because just as the probability
of correct decision increases with move
32. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 21; John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703 (2002); John 0.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1999); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The
Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483
(1995).
33. Brett W. King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical Context, Popular Sovereignty,
and Supermajority Rules, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 609 (2000); Brett W. King, The Use of
Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution: The Framers, The Federalist Papers and the
Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 363 (1998).
34. DENNIS MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1996); DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989).
35. Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723 (2001); Saul
Levmore, More Than Mere Majorities, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 759.
36. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 140 (1989); Amy Gutmann,
Deliberative Democracy and Majority Rule, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 227, 230 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald Slye eds., 1999). This is
arguably the most oft-cited deficiency of supermajority rules.
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toward unanimity, so does the
probability that the minority is wrong
increase; accordingly, providing the
minority veto power may be unwise37
" coalition-building reifies groups and can be
balkanizing
" no better than simple majority at avoiding
Condorcet losers (i.e., choices that
might win in a ranking system but that
would fail in pair-wise competition with
other choices)
Rule: Majoritarianism
Theorists and Proponents: Dah138/ Rae 39/
May40/Michelman
41
Pros:
" promotes the greatest good for the greatest
number
" does not suppress conflict
" allows deliberation to fulfill its function
practically1
2
" promotes equality
" promotes responsiveness
" enables discovery of the "correct" answer
(Condorcet Jury Theorem)
43
" tolerates dissent with open arms, leading to a
37. DAHL, supra note 36, at 142.
38. See id.
39. Douglas W. Rae, The Limits of Consensual Decision, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1270
(1975); Douglas W. Rae, Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice, 63
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 40 (1969).
40. Kenneth 0. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for
Simple Majority Rule, 10 ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952).
41. Frank I. Michelman, Why Voting?, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 985 (2001) (enumerating
utilitarian, egalitarian, and epistemic benefits of majority rule); see also Anthony Downs,
In Defense of Majority Voting, 69 J. POL. ECON. 192 (1961).
42. Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338
(1987).
43. "[A] majority vote among a suitably large body of voters, all of whom are more
likely than not to vote correctly, will almost surely result in the correct outcome." Paul
Edelman, Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327
(2002). Of course, what it means to "vote correctly" is not clear: voters often 'accidentally'
vote at odds with their preferences because they fail accurately to assess candidates or
ballot initiatives.
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more open society
* allows for quick change when change is
necessary
Cons:
" results in compromises no one really wants
because it leads to two-party
competition where both parties are
moderate and homogenous
" prone to the tyranny of the majority
" no promise of cost minimization because each
side is incentivized to get every last
vote, as a single person's vote could be
decisive
" easiest to manipulate with capture
• will still select Condorcet losers (i.e., choices
that might win in a ranking system but
that would fail in pair-wise competition
with other choices)
" presumes political equality without actually
ensuring it: some minority groups may
need more than one vote to have a
truly equal voice"
A. Unanimity
Let's take unanimity first. Its credibility as a democratic decision
rule is often impugned because it seems to call for a homogeneity that
liberal democracies assume is non-existent and ultimately
undesirable. Conceding the fact that a pluralistic society will have
members who value different ultimate ends, democrats resort to non-
unanimous decision procedures to enable collective action; if
everyone had a veto, nothing could get done. Nevertheless, the
practical opposition to the decision rule does not necessarily convince
all democrats that leaving it in place as a regulative ideal or an
aspiration is misguided. Indeed, unanimity plays a role in quite a few
thinkers' democratic political theory.
Robert Paul Wolff defends anarchism precisely because he
thinks a unanimous direct democracy is the only decision rule that
preserves individual autonomy against governmental coercion."
44. McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 32, at
730.
45. See WOLFF, supra note 28.
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James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, from a broadly conceived
economistic libertarian perspective endorse unanimity as the linchpin
of legitimacy in constitutional politics. 6 And Jane Mansbridge, from
a communitarian perspective, marshals empirical evidence for the
proposition that social forces can often be optimized under unanimity
rules;47 she prefers a unitary democracy to the adversarial democracy
associated with majoritarianism. 48 Mansbridge thinks getting beyond
adversarial democracy will help suppress conflict and focus attention
on unity and the common good.
Finally, Arend Lijphart, from a comparativist orientation, is
often associated with the view that there are varieties of
nonmajoritarian democracies that should be preferred to the pure
majoritarian form.49  He is one of the foremost expositors and
proponents of what he calls "consensus democracy" and
"consociational democracy;" these are democracies that are
functional and stable with decision rules shy of unanimity but more
sensitive to minorities than pure majoritarian regimes. He writes,
"An ideal democratic government would be one whose actions were
always in perfect correspondence with the preferences of all its
citizens."5 Lijphart uses this ideal of unanimous consent to argue for
regimes that build in protections for electoral minorities: such regimes
encourage deliberation, elicit information that may otherwise remain
undisclosed, and look to build broad coalitions and empower
minorities, even if they don't give them a veto power (which they
sometimes can, of course).
The disadvantages of unanimous decision rules, however, are
obvious, even to those who wish to see more unanimity used; its
proponents are not surprised that the rule is not often selected for
political life. As the lists above suggest, unanimity often results in
compromises no one really wants; it unduly privileges the status quo;
46. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note29.
47. See Tali Mendelberg, The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence, in 6
RESEARCH IN MICROPOLITICS 39 (Michael Delli Carpini et al. eds., 2000), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-talim/TheDeliberativeCitizen.pdf.
48. See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 30, at 3, 5 (arguing also for "consensus" as a
decision rule, which is different from unanimity and can be assimilated to a form of
supermajoritarianism); see also Nagel, supra note 27, at 123 ("Majoritarianism is, after all,
inherently adversarial").
49. See LIJPHART, supra note 31; AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY
(1999); Arend Lijphart, Varieties of Nonmajoritarian Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 225.
50. See LIJPHART, supra note 31, at 1.
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it is extremely difficult and time-consuming to reach such high
thresholds of agreement; and it can lead to the repression of conflicts,
which, in turn, can lead to alienation, preference falsification, and
hostility among members who have gone along with decisions merely
to end debate and go home.
B. Majoritarianism
Next let's consider majoritarianism. The rule's proponents range
from liberals to utilitarians. Kenneth May's defense builds on
(Kenneth Arrow's) three criteria for desirable vote aggregation:
monotonicity, undifferentiatedness, and neutrality." Monotonicity
requires that the social choice is not made to favor the option losing
support; that is, there must be positive responsiveness-if everyone is
indifferent and one person votes, the decision rule should be
responsive to that one vote. Undifferentiatedness requires that each
person's vote be counted the same, regardless of who cast the vote;
anonymity is required. And neutrality requires that the status quo not
be given any weighted advantage. It should be obvious how
unanimity and supermajoritarianism do not satisfy all of these
conjunctive conditions and how majoritariansim does: unanimity and
supermajoritarianism both fail the conditions of monotonicity and
neutrality.
More, Robert Dahl and Douglas Rae emphasize the utility and
equality gains associated with majority rule: it maximizes the good of
self-determination over the set of individuals making a decision and
instantiates a form of political equality." Finally, as a consequence of
what is called the Condorcet Jury Theorem, there are epistemic
benefits to majority rule: it is likely to discover the correct answer (if
(1) it is a correct answer one is after; (2) all citizens are assumed to be
equally likely to be correct; and (3) that probability is assumed to be
greater than 50%).53 The disadvantages of majority rule are many-
fold, even if the Condorcet Jury Theorem's assumptions are
unimpeachable. Some of these 'cons' are listed above and I refer the
reader there.
C. Supermajoritarianism
What then of supermajoritarianism? Is it merely a compromise
51. May, supra note 40, at 680-81.
52. DAHL, supra note 36, at 138-42; see Rae sources cited supra note 39.
53. See Edelman, supra note 43, at 327.
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position or does it have a normative political theory of its own? I
wish to suggest that supermajoritarianism has a catalogue of
advantages that go beyond a mere navigation of the advantages and
disadvantages of the other rules. This theoretical perspective,
moreover, is underemphasized by political theorists and lawyers even
though, as I will argue in Part IV, the United States can be usefully
classified as a supermajoritarian regime.
First, there is no embarrassment in a compromise position that
confers net benefits that neither other rule can. Supermajoritarian
rules clearly do navigate between majoritarian and unanimous
decision rules, enjoying some of the benefits of each while mitigating
some of their respective disadvantages. Supermajoritarianism
enhances deliberation by requiring higher levels of agreement,
maximizes legitimacy by insisting on more agreement than simple
majorities do, directs attention to common goods, and furnishes
stability against rapidly shifting majorities, all while incentivizing
coalition-formation and the publicizing of private information to
garner larger majorities. Majority rules confer a degree of legitimacy
as well of course, but since majorities are very easy to form, there is
usually less need for coalition-forming and publicizing private
information. Since a simple uninformed vote without any
deliberation will routinely achieve a majority (or, at the very least, a
plurality),' the decision rule has pathologies because it is so easily
achieved, especially if more considered or deliberative preferences
are valued. A supermajority requirement, by setting the bar higher,
allows the enactment of only consensus positions, while discouraging
the tyranny of simple majorities.5 Unanimity also requires broad
coalitions leading to deliberation and focuses attention on common
goods; but it creates incentives to falsify preferences and to keep
information private, rendering legitimacy suspect.
Supermajoritarianism finds a way to pave a middle ground to attempt
to optimize many democratic desiderata to a feasible extent; and that
compromise has normative force.
The built-in preference for the status quo that a supermajority
rule affords is a source of much criticism of supermajoritarianism 6
54. It is worth highlighting that even among 'majoritarians,' there is a general
assumption that pluralities will often suffice: a candidate or policy initiative needn't always
get 50.1% of the vote, only more votes than the second place finisher.
55. On the flip side, however, it also allows a relatively small group of holdouts to
prevent action.
56. See DAHL, supra note 36, at 140; Gutmann, supra note 36, at 230.
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There are at least two affirmative reasons democrats might want
protection for the status quo in certain institutional contexts. First,
stability often recommends it: if constitutions are always up for grabs
by constantly shifting majorities, constitutional politics can be
disorienting, distracting government from the business of normal
politics. This is why written constitutions often require special
majorities for their amendment. Second, if a regime wishes to
privilege deliberative and representative legislation to non-
deliberative directly democratic decision-making, democrats might
want to privilege the status quo when that status quo has been
produced by deliberative and representative legislation. This would
mean requiring a supermajority decision rule for measures of direct
democracy if they contravene more deliberative legislation.57
Consider in this vein Switzerland, where a majority of a majority of
cantons is required to pass a referendum." This is a more specific
case of the general reason to want higher threshold decision rules for
change: what McGinnis and Rappaport call "attractive baselines."5 9 If
we like the rule currently in place (or the process that brought it
about), supermajority rules can benefit us-and we have no reason to
shy away from the criticism that we are privileging the status quo
because it sometimes makes sense to do so.
There are also structural advantages to supermajoritarianism
that are revealed most clearly when considering the potential 'costs'
of a decision rule-the costs a person might consider when deciding
upon a decision rule. These costs include: (1) error costs, or the costs
associated with making a bad or erroneous choice; (2) decision costs,
or the time and effort it takes to make a decision; (3) personal costs,
or the costs associated with having a rule affect the decision-maker
negatively now or in the future; and (4) transaction costs, or the side-
payments necessary to achieve the level of agreement required by the
decision rule.' While the consideration of these costs doesn't make it
57. See generally ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004) (arguing for a
supermajority rule in the context of direct democracy and explaining the benefits of
deliberative decision-making); Ethan J. Leib, Redeeming the Welshed Guarantee: A
Scheme for Achieving Justiciability, 24 WHITTIER LAW REVIEW 143 (2002) (exploring
republicanism and its commitment to deliberative decision-making).
58. See Kris Kobach, Switzerland, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE
GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 98 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994).
59. McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 32, at
742.
60. This cost analysis is adapted from Grofman, supra note 26, at 54; BUCHANAN &
TULLOCK, supra note 29, chaps. 15-17; and McGinnis & Rappaport, Our
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obvious that democrats should opt for supermajority rules in every
circumstance, they can recommend when such rules might be
appropriate. For example, McGinnis and Rappaport argue that when
minority special interests are organized and funded such that they can
too easily buy a majority bloc of votes (by contributing to the
dominant party, say), supermajority rules may be appropriate because
they will encourage pluralism without allowing for easy capture.6'
It is worth considering how these categories of costs might help
us evaluate supermajoritarianism. The decision costs associated with
supermajoritarianism, for example, are usually going to be higher
than the decision costs majority rule imposes; but they are
considerably lower than the costs exacted under unanimity, where
there is a greater likelihood that a single individual will hold out and
prevent an affirmative decision from being made. However, one
could argue that compensation for these extra decision costs (above
the costs majority rule exacts) is afforded by the rule's avoidance of
error costs. By making the threshold of agreement higher, one can
argue that certain errors can be avoided, errors that could come to
pass if all that is required for affirmative action is a simple majority.
Without a higher threshold for agreement, no deliberation is
incentivized, deliberation which could reveal important and relevant
information necessary to make a good decision. So the decision rule
can be thought to trade decision costs for error costs, attempting to
'break even' by sacrificing some decision cost 'losses' for error cost
'gains. '
Personal costs also require careful weighing and may recommend
supermajoritarianism in certain domains. In the context of the
criminal jury, for example, there are countervailing considerations
associated with personal costs. Any particular individual may want to
opt for a unanimity rule, thinking (perhaps wrongly)63 that it will work
Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 32, at 728-50.
61. McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 32, at
734-39.
62. To be sure, the supermajoritarian decision rule still can be described as a version
of 'minority rule.' But that is just the other side of 'supermajority rule,' with heightened
degrees of consensus and deliberation. Also, 'minority rule' may be a mischaracterization
if the status quo is a regime put in place by a temporally prior supermajority. If the 'dead
hand' was one that once achieved a supermajority, as opposed to a mere majority, waiting
until a new supermajority can be achieved for change may be less problematic. Id. at 796-
800, discuss the "supermajoritarian solution to the dead hand problem."
63. If it is an acquittal she is after, the symmetrical unanimity requirement might
work to her disadvantage, of course. Although one might think that a hung jury is a de
facto equivalent to an acquittal, hung juries often lead to re-prosecution and/or plea deals
Winter & Spring 2006]SUPERMAJORITARIANISM AND THE CRIMINAL JURY 161
to her advantage if she commits a crime. But the same person,
assuming that it will be unlikely that she will ever be charged with a
crime, may want a majority rule system, thinking she is worse off with
a system that allows too many criminals to roam free. The weighing
of these costs can recommend a supermajority rule, as it navigates
between the advantages of each rule; again, the compromise can have
normative force.
Transaction costs are hard to measure in the abstract; but once
one picks a context, they become easier to assess. For example,
supermajoritarianism actually can be thought to be easier to corrupt
than majoritarianism in certain contexts because someone who wishes
to "buy" a decision will oftentimes only need to pay a superminority
to hold out and prevent an affirmative decision from being made. Say
a ballot initiative requires 66% of the voting public to pass. A
committed individual trying to prevent the initiative from passing will
find it cheaper to buy her result than under majority rule, where she
will have to buy the votes of 50.1% of the voting public rather than
33.4% of that same pool under supermajoritarianism. On the other
hand, someone in favor of the initiative will have to pay more to get it
passed under supermajoritarianism than under pure majoritarianism.
Accordingly, transaction costs are hard to measure without more
information about context-and depend on the desirability of the
baseline as much as they do on the decision rule itself. Unanimity
works the same way on the transaction cost register: if all you want is
to buy a hung jury in a criminal trial under the unanimity rule, it is
extremely cheap to get the result by paying off a lone juror. But if
you want to buy an acquittal (or a conviction), it is the most expensive
rule there is, since you'd have to pay everyone.
To be sure, supermajority rules have a catalogue of
disadvantages. First, by encouraging coalitions, the resulting
compromises may result in alternatives that are actually disfavored by
a majority or plurality. There may be a majority available for a
particular proposition that gets defanged to build more support.
Also, supermajority rule, just like majority rule, still can select
'Condorcet losers' and eliminate a 'Condorcet winner.' 64 Moreover, it
(for which the defendant will be punished notwithstanding the hung jury). See AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 23 (2005), available at
www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf (one-third of the cases that produce
hung juries get re-tried; half lead to dismissals or plea agreements) (citing PAULA L.
HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM?, 83-84 (2002)). From the
perspective of stigma too, acquittals are not comparable to hung juries.
64. A 'Condorcet loser' is a decision that would lose in head-on competition with all
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can, like unanimity, encourage preference falsification (though, of
course, so can majoritarianism in theory). And supermajorities often
61confer no additional confidence in the rightness of the outcome.Refer to the executive summary for more.
D. Classifying Regimes
The discussion of supermajority rules above seems remarkably
context-specific, showing any rule to be recommended only for
particular institutional choices. I have given a typology of decision
rules that suggests that eclecticism is probably the best strategy in
designing a polity: there is rarely a reason to (and there is good
reason not to) decide on one uniform decision rule for all institutional
other alternatives; a 'Condorcet winner' beats all other alternatives in pair-wise
comparisons. The famous 'voting paradox' suggests that-under very simple
assumptions-neither majority nor supermajority voting helps eliminate losers or picks
winners; indeed, according to a school of social choice that has extensively analyzed
different voting rules, the order of presenting alternatives can lead to incoherent
preference aggregation and intransitive rankings. For more on these social choice
aggregation problems, see generally the work of Levmore, supra note 35. For a nice
explanation and history of cycling problems, see, e.g., Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law,
Majority Decision Making, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971 (1989). But there
is recent work suggesting that cycling is much more hypothetical than empirical, at least at
the macro-level of political decision-making in legislatures. See GERRY MACKIE,
DEMOCRACY DEFENDED (2003) (exhaustively discussing the social choice literature on
decision rules and their consequences for democracy); Don Herzog, Dragonslaying, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 757 (2005) (reviewing and summarizing Mackie); but see Saul Levmore,
Public Choice Defended, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 777 (2005) (same, but criticizing Mackie's
focus on Congress because cycling is less likely to appear there than in other political and
social contexts). In short, cycling is "the paradox that arises if, for example, there are
three individuals or subgroups, 1, 2, and 3, with preferences of ABC, CAB, and BCA,
respectively. With simple majority voting, A defeats B, B defeats C, and yet C defeats A."
Id. at 780.
65. The jury is one context where thresholds higher than simple majorities may do
some work to ensure a verdicts' rightness. If accuracy of a verdict means conformity with
the "product rule," a supermajority or unanimity helps us be sure that the defendant
should indeed by held liable or found guilty. For this very interesting issue, see Levmore,
Conjunction and Aggregation, supra note 35.
Here is what is meant by conformity with the 'product rule:' If there are multiple
requirements for guilt (say, both X and Y must be true), and guilt must be beyond a
reasonable doubt (say, with 90% certainty), majority rule may create a conjunction
problem. If half of the jurors think X is true with 90% confidence and that Y is true with
90% confidence, it may be that there is only 81% certainty in the verdict and that the
reasonable doubt threshold has not been met. But under majority rule, the majority of
jurors will vote guilty. Supermajority requirements (and unanimity requirements) help
protect against this anomaly. Read Levmore to understand just how. In short, the more
people that are needed to reach the confidence level, the more likely it is that some jurors
in the supermajority have an even greater confidence level that can help us worry about
the conjunction problems less.
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contexts. Nevertheless, central to the project of this Article is
classifying regimes as having predispositions to selecting one class of
decision rules. In Part IV, I try to describe the United States as a
supermajoritarian regime. Here I simply wish to suggest that such
broad classifications of regime types are possible and useful by
explaining very quickly a prominent classification of regime by
decision rule type: Arend Lijphart's distinction between the
consensus and the majoritarian democracies.
Lijphart's classification of democracies has been extraordinarily
influential in the field of political science. He distinguishes two ideal
types of democracy based upon the collection of their decision rules.
Lijphart's distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy
fundamentally derives from two different answers to a basic question:
How many people have their preferences taken into account in the
policy decisions of government? Majoritarian democracy answers
'more than half the people,' but with no requirement of a
supermajority. Consensus democracy, according to Lijphart, answers
'as many people as possible." ' 6
The majoritarian democracy-also known as the Westminster
model-has the following institutional features associated with it,
even though no actual democracy has all such features: (1) executive
power is concentrated in a cabinet chosen by a majority party; (2) the
cabinet dominates the Parliament; (3) there is a two party system; (4)
the system of elections is majoritarian (first past the post) and
disproportional (single member districts); (5) interest group pluralism
exists; (6) there is a unitary and centralized government; (7)
unicameral legislatures make law; (8) there is no written constitution
and what there is has easy amendment procedures; (9) there is no
judicial review; and (10) central banks are controlled by the
61executive.
By contrast, the main features of consensus democracy include:
"oversized coalitions, executive-legislative balance of power, a
multiparty system, multiple issue dimensions, electoral
proportionality, federalism and decentralization, bicameralism, [] a
rigid constitution protected by judicial review," and central bank
independence.6  His paradigmatic examples of majoritarian
66. Nagel, supra note 27, at 117 (citing LIJPHART, supra note 31, at 4).
67. See generally L1JPHART, supra note 49 (where the additional consideration of a
central bank augments the analysis from the 1984 classification, LIJPHART, supra note 31,
and the executive-parties and unitary-federal dimension are put in greater relief).
68. Lijphart, supra note 49, at 228.
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democracies include the United Kingdom and New Zealand (despite
its change to proportional representation in 1996), and the
paradigmatic examples of consensus democracies include Switzerland
and Belgium. The United States emerges in Lijphart's work "as the
most prominent example of a mixed majoritarian-consensual type of
democracy."6 9 On the one hand, the United States has a majoritarian
electoral system with two parties. On the other, it has a written
constitution with judicial review, where the 13 smallest states with a
mere 5% of the population can block constitutional amendments.
More, it is bicameral, where the Senate over-represents small states.70
Lijphart is now interested in "establishing that consensus
democracies are more egalitarian and participatory and offer better
representation of women and minorities. They are also more welfare-
oriented, more environment-friendly, and less punitive in their
criminal justice systems., 71 If I could assimilate consensus democracy
and supermajoritarian democracy-or at least show that they perform
similarly on these registers-I might be able to show
supermajoritarianism as conducive to yet another series of benefits.
Yet I do not wish to make an effort here to engage in such
assimilation. The purpose of this diversion is only to show that such
classification is possible, and that one can aggregate institutional
decision rules and say something useful about the decision rules
prevalent in a regime as a whole. In sum, regimes are susceptible to
analysis based upon their decision rule choices.
III. Decision Rules for the Criminal Jury
Before I turn to my depiction of the United States as
supermajoritarian and the coherentist argument targeted to bolster a
supermajoritarian decision rule in the context of the criminal jury, I
hope to provide a sense of the various arguments offered on behalf of
proposed decision schemes in the particular institutional context of
the criminal jury. Again here, I provide an executive summary.72 To
69. LIJPHART, supra note 31, at 36. Ultimately, he classifies the United States as
majoritarian.
70. Id. at 190.
71. David Wilsford, Studying Democracy and Putting it into Practice: The
Contributions of Arend Lijphart to Democratic Theory and to Actual Democracy, in
DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 1, 2.
72. The "Southern California electoral systems mafia," "a group of political scientists
working in the tradition of Lijphart and others at UC-San Diego and UC-Irvine, tends to
use the chart and executive summary form to simplify and summarize the advantages and
disadvantages of various decision rules. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONS, supra
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be sure, each year some law review article appears that retreads this
territory at exorbitant length (I suppose that is what the law reviews
are for), and I refer the reader to WESTLAW or LEXIS for those
treatments. My contribution here is merely to provide quick sound-
bites and citations to give a flavor for the state of the field so that I
can show how my approach differs from the standard modes of
approaching the question of the appropriate decision rule in the
context of the criminal jury.
A few preliminary observations, however. Take note that my
executive summary is subdivided along the dimension of the potential
symmetry of a decision rule because asymmetric costs may militate
against symmetrical rules. If the set of cost considerations
enumerated in Part II.C are weighed, it should be easy to see that
they may recommend asymmetry. As I shall argue in Part IV, the
supermajority rule I wish to support is only for conviction; for
acquittal, I endorse a majority rule. This permutation of asymmetry
is unique to the decisional choices currently on the proverbial table;
usually those in favor of supermajority requirements argue for an
acquittal either upon a failure to achieve the relevant supermajority
or upon a supermajority voting affirmatively for acquittal. To be
sure, symmetry is usually presumed without careful consideration,
irrespective of an analyst's preferred decision rule.
Taking a/symmetry into account, the executive summary has five
parts. The first analyzes the arguments for the symmetrical unanimity
rule, which is the norm in most United States jurisdictions for felony
trials: it requires unanimity to convict and unanimity to acquit-or
the jury hangs. The second analyzes the arguments for a one-way
unanimity rule: it would require unanimity to convict, with any vote
shy of unanimity providing a defendant a full acquittal, disabling the
prosecution from trying the defendant again. No one I have ever
come across professionally or otherwise endorses this rule, suggesting
that our commitment to the presumption of innocence may be less
than whole-hearted. The third column analyzes a symmetrical
supermajority rule, proposing supermajority requirements for both
conviction and acquittal. The fourth summarizes the arguments for
and against a one-way supermajority rule, requiring a supermajority
to convict but allowing any vote shy of the supermajority to acquit the
note 24, at 50-51, 57-58, 156, 173. I adopt their strategy in this Article even though I am
not a comparativist by training and even though I find myself in Northern, rather than
Southern, California. For more on the labeling of this group of scholars, see Grofman,
supra note 26, at 61 n.9.
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defendant.73 The final column considers the virtues and disadvantages
of a pure majoritarianism in the criminal jury context.
Another notable feature of the comprehensive (though not
exhaustive) list below is the parallels that can be traced with Part II's
analysis. The following considerations appear in both analyses: the
desire (1) to incentivize deliberation in the voters or jurors, (2) to
procure accuracy of decision, (3) to reveal private information about
the subject matter under debate (information that only some
members may have or remember), (4) to confer legitimacy both
internally to the decision-makers and to the public at large, (5) to
achieve representativeness of the views of the decision-makers, and
(6) to pay sufficient sensitivity to minority dissent and majority
tyranny. In both the general and specific cases, there is a desire to
remain attentive to the pathologies associated with the balkanization
and excessive decision costs that may result from giving holdouts too
much power, as well as the problem of preference falsification that
sometimes results when consensus is required.
But the specific institutional context of the jury triggers the
consideration of other factors as well, including: (1) the potential civic
virtues fostered by various decision rules, (2) the empirical
consequences of various decision rules and their efficiency (as
evidenced in social science experiments and modeling), (3) the
sentiments of jurors towards deliberation and verdict under the
various decision rules, (4) the effect that the presumption of
innocence should have on the chosen decision rule, (5) the effect a
chosen rule will have on a prosecutor's choice of what to charge-
because the more stringent the decision rule, the more likely the
jurors will pick a compromise of a lesser included offense,74 (6) the
73. As I highlighted supra note 9, the military uses this rule for most non-capital
offenses.
74. Doug Berman has urged me to consider that, in light of Stephanos Bibas's
argument that only four percent of defendants actually get a jury trial, any argument
about jury decision rules should focus on "the shadows that any proposed reform
would cast over plea bargaining." Doug Berman, As if juries really matter in
criminal cases..., SENTENCING L. & POL'Y BLOG, available at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/2005/10/as-if-juriesre.html
(citing Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001)). Berman is right, of course, that the focus on the
jury decision rule is a narrow one indeed and I have, accordingly, included consideration
of how decision rule choice may influence charging decisions.
Yet it is very hard to hazard a guess about whether a symmetrical unanimity
requirement in particular is doing any work to encourage defendants to go to trial. We
know that very few defendants do go to trial-and one could argue that whatever
discouragement is further afforded by relaxed decision rule requirements on the
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degree of belief in the jury as merely a fact-finder, (7) whether it is
important to make nullification easy or difficult,75 (8) whether jury
selection procedures should have an effect on the decision rule, and
(9) an evaluation of the phenomenon of the hung jury. My intention
here is not to address each of these issues at length but merely to
highlight their relevance in any discussion about jury decision rules.
For example, if one finds it particularly important to avoid the
waste of resources associated with hung juries, one could prefer a
particular form of asymmetrical rule: requiring unanimity or a
supermajority to convict and treating a failure to achieve the
threshold as an acquittal. A majority rule may also suffice.76 If one
finds it especially important that a presumption of innocence should
be institutionalized, requiring unanimity or a supermajority to acquit
seems virtually indefensible, though that is our current practice, of
course. If the jury merely finds facts, perhaps unanimity is more
defensible because factual truths should garner full consensus. If,
however, the jury decides many questions of value, value pluralism
usually encourages a decision rule shy of unanimity. If jury selection
procedures continue to make it harder and harder to remove jurors, 77
conviction side could be offset by the relaxed agreement requirements on the acquittal
side. In short, although Berman's point is well taken, it is really just guesswork and many
other facets of decision rule choice are worth considering as well. I suppose it would be an
interesting empirical project to see if Louisiana and Oregon defendants' decisions to go to
trial are at all influenced by the relaxed decision rule. However, since the rule I propose is
not one in place in any jurisdiction, it would remain challenging to evaluate how my
proposed rule would affect defendant decision-making.
75. Nullification is when juries refuse to convict (or affirmatively acquit) a defendant
of a charged crime not because the jury is convinced of the innocence of the defendant but
because jurors are convinced of the injustice of the laws under which the defendant is
being charged or of the injustice of the application of the laws to the circumstances of the
defendant. Jurors have the power of nullification, for better or worse, and the exercise of
that power (when it is clear that it is being exercised) can be used by the state to garner
information about what members of the citizenry think of a law, its scope, a prosecutor's
techniques, and the like. We'll have to bracket the debate about the "legitimacy" and
inherent "illegality" of nullification, as well as the argument that juries should settle
questions of law rather than questions of fact. Reasonable people can disagree about
whether it is a practice to be encouraged. For a nice summary of the history and issues
surrounding nullification, see ABRAMSON, supra note 3, at 67-88. The Supreme Court is
said to have repudiated the practice in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), but there
can be no question that its practice is nearly impossible to police effectively and that the
power continues to be exercised by juries to the chagrin of prosecutors everywhere.
76. Of course if we maintain juries of even numbers (are we superstitious about 13? Is
11 really too few?), we can still imagine hung juries with simple majoritarianism.
77. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 511 U.S.
127 (1994).
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more obstinate and politically active jurors may be seated, suggesting
that unanimity might be too much to expect. If peremptory
challenges are to be disfavored altogether because they cannot be
exercised in anything but a discriminatory or prejudiced fashion,"8
unanimity may be unattainable.
Let me proceed to map the decisional options and their
rationales and weaknesses; I do not suggest that this executive
summary is fully exhaustive, only that it is representative of views one
is likely to encounter in the literature, with arguments cutting in many
different directions.
Rule: Symmetrical Unanimity
Theorists and Proponents: Smith7 9/ Primus8S/
Kassin 81/ Hastie et al.82 / Abramson 83/
The American Bar Association8
Pros:
" more thorough verdicts, eliciting more
information from every juror; extensive
deliberation serves a function of bringing
out as much independent knowledge of
evidence as possible85
" inculcates moral-educative virtues (especially
the civic virtue of deliberation) and forces
78. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 3, at 139-41; AMAR, supra note 12, at 170-71;
Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images,
and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 560-563 (1986); see also supra note 9 (highlighting
courts martial, where each side gets only a single peremptory and the decision rule is non-
unanimous in non-capital cases).
79. See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441 (1997).
80. See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a
Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARD. L. REV. 1417 (1997).
81. See Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 687 (1990).
82. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983).
83. See ABRAMSON, supra note 3.
84. See THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY
TRIALS 21-25 (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf.
85. See Nemeth, supra note 10 (using 6-person juries); see also James H. Davis et al.,
The Decision Processes of 6- and 12-Person Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and Two-
Thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1975) (finding that
although verdicts did not vary under different decision rules, average deliberation time
was increased under unanimity).
Winter & Spring 2006]SUPERMAJORITARIANISM AND THE CRIMINAL JURY 169
jurors to look past their 'group' interests86
" political function is reinforced by having
community speak with one civic voice
" patina of legitimacy to the public relies on
reaching unanimity
" in 10% of cases using a unanimity rule, the first
ballot minority convinces the majority, 88
proving that the minority does not get
railroaded under this decision rule
" the objective truth should be subjectively
convincing, and, inversely, the full
agreement of subjective convictions is
the criterion of objective truth89
" jurors under unanimity are more satisfied than
their majority rule counterparts that
deliberation was fair and complete 9°
-even under unanimity, only 6.2% of juries
deadlock,91 a reasonable price to pay for
the certainty unanimity affords
92
- governing others in the jury may be different
from self-govemment, where rules other
than unanimity are acceptable; although
in politics we are engaged in self-
government, a jury is a unit of other-
government, where different rules should
prevail
93
86. See, e.g., DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 12, at 273-74.
87. See Gary C. Jacobsohn, The Unanimous Verdict: Politics and the Jury Trial, 39
WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 48-57 (1977). This is probably the most common justification for the
unanimity rule. For empirical evidence that citizens link legitimacy and unanimity, see
Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens' Perceptions of the Criminal
Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988)
(finding perceptions of fairness to be related to decision rule design, but finding a
willingness to trade procedural costs and thoroughness of deliberation depending on
seriousness of crime).
88. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 488-89.
89. See GEORG SIMMEL, The Phenomenon of Outvoting, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
GEORG SIMMEL (Kurt Wolff ed. & trans., 1950) (1908).
90. See generally SAKS, supra note 10.
91. National Center for State Courts, Jury Decision-Making FAQs, available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/FAQs/JurDecFAQ.htm (last modified on July 18, 2005).
92. For experimental evidence that unanimity is likely to lead to a higher rate of hung
juries (as if you needed any), see generally SAKS, supra note 10; Nemeth, supra note 10;
Kerr et al., supra note 10; and Buckhout et al., supra note 10. But see Padawer-Singer et
al., supra note 10 (finding non-unanimous juries to hang more often).
93. Primus, supra note 80.
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" deliberation should be emphasized over voting
and representation; using political
decision rules is inappropriate in the jury
context, where value pluralism should
give way to searching for the truth94
" unanimity is part of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard
" the rule has been around for a long time
" it was fine to have less severe rules when juries
were very large (as in Athens), but
smaller juries need to compensate with
unanimity
" there is evidence that jurors that don't deliberate
under unanimity consider their
deliberations less thorough and tend to
think their fellow jurors are less open-
minded95
" since jurors are still overwhelmingly male and
white, unanimity forces white men to
listen to minority jurors who are often
members of minorities that have suffered
exclusion from juries in the past 96
Cons:
" higher chances of deadlock and wasted
resources
" leads to Allen97 charges, which intimidates the
minority
" giving everyone a veto is too radical and too
high a cost to pay
" groups told to use unanimous rule polarize by
gender98
94. ABRAMSON, supra note 3, at 205.
95. Diamond et al., supra note 17 (analyzing 50 civil juror deliberations in Arizona,
with 16 non-unanimous verdicts). It should be noted that although less and lower quality
deliberation ostensibly took place under non-unanimous verdicts in Diamond et al.'s
sample, the rules at issue were all symmetrical; accordingly it is impossible to ascertain
whether the jurors in the minority might have deliberated more if they had a better chance
of getting the verdict they wanted with a lower threshold requirement for their preferred
verdict. Of course, the hybrid I ultimately propose could not neatly be applied in the civil
jury context.
96. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1261 (2000).
97. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (allowing judges to charge a
deadlocked jury with a firm instruction to work toward a verdict).
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" minority jurors deliberating under unanimity
feel uncomfortable during deliberations 99
" with very few exceptions, the first ballot
determines the outcome of the verdict,
regardless of the decision rule, so
unanimity is unnecessary 00
" fetishizing unanimity puts process over
outcome: just because some want to
incentivize deliberation doesn't mean
the jury system can dispense with the
task at hand: deciding the fate of the
defendant without hanging
" juries don't only decide facts (even if that is
their official role); they decide norms
too, where unanimity is simply too much
to ask for
" if commonsense is the virtue, why not side with
9, 10 or 11 people over the few?
" historians suggest that the rule is an historical
accident10 '
" England, Australia, Ireland, and South Africa all
relaxed the requirement even though
they once adhered to the unanimity
rule'02
Rule: Asymmetrical Unanimity
Theorists and Proponents: No one I've ever
read.
Pros:
" would do away with all hung juries
" gives full force to the idea that proof needs to be
beyond a reasonable doubt; even if a
second jury were to achieve unanimity
after the first hangs, the full panel of 24
98. Martin F. Kaplan & Charles E. Miller, Group Decision-Making and Normative
Versus Informational Influence: Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned Decision Rule, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 306 (1987).
99. See Nemeth, supra note 10 (finding that conflict is more intense under unanimity
rules).
100. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 488.
101. See, e.g., SIR P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 48 (1988).
102. Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, And So Say Some of Us... What To
Do When Jurors Disagree, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 429, 445-46 (2000) (citing local laws).
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could still not be said to be unanimous
" gives full effect to the presumption of innocence
" nullifying would be easy, getting more
information from the citizenry
" the prosecution should never get two bites at
the apple if the jury is there to protect the
accused against the state
" on the European Continent, juries use one-way
rules1"3
Cons:
-seems too likely to let people off the hook
-forces the prosecutor to under-charge
-this voting rule has attracted no proponents; no
country uses the rule in the criminal jury
context
0 4
-symmetry seems fairer
-Americans don't actually assume innocence; it
is a heuristic for jurors so that they keep
an open mind
Rule: Symmetrical Supermajority
Theorist and Proponent: Morehead
105
Pros:
" even when unanimity is the required decision
rule, many groups will unanimously opt to
bind themselves to a supermajority
rule'
06
" the minority has a better chance of flipping the
vote under supermajority, which will in
turn incentivize deliberation; in any case,
there are external mechanisms available
to enforce deliberation so we do not need
to rely solely on the decision rule'
°7
103. Id. at 446-47 (citing local laws).
104. Id. at 448.
105. See Jere W. Morehead, A "Modest" Proposal for Jury Reform: The Elimination of
Required Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 933 (1998).
106. See Davis et al., supra note 85.
107. When the British began to allow supermajority verdicts in 1967, they required
jurors to deliberate for at least two hours. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION
PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 206 n. 65
(1977).
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" assigning supermajority or unanimous decision
rules makes little consistent difference to
verdicts
" 55% of all hung juries are estimated to be split
6-6, 7-5, 8-4, or 9-3;108 accordingly, a 10-
2 requirement would trigger deliberation
in most cases.
" it is harder to remove bizarre jurors from the
panel owing to restrictions in jury
selection procedures, so a supermajority
helps control against holdouts
" reinforces an ideal of allowing dissent, which we
do among judges and in politics
" provides an opportunity to track citizen
preferences better, providing more
information to the state about particular
defendants and particular laws
" allows for nullification to happen more easily
" compromises are less likely than under
unanimity so greater accuracy is actually
more likely109
" supermajorities ensure that aggregation will
cohere with the product rule, something
simple majorities do less well110
" while the 6.2% hung jury number is an average,
there are cities that report rates as high
as 30%. By contrast, in Oregon (a state
with supermajority rules), eight counties
report a rate of .4%111
" since Americans care more about getting
decisions right efficiently than paying for
lessons in civic virtue, it makes sense to
prefer a cheap and accurate decision
108. James Kachmar, Silencing the Minority: Permitting Non-unanimous Jury Verdicts
in Criminal Trials, 28 PAC. L.J. 273, 302 (1996)
109. HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 215
(1996).
110. See the explanation of the product rule supra note 65.
111. Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 102, at 438. "A recent study undertaken by the
National Center for State Courts and National Institute of Justice examined hung jury
rates in 28 state and federal courts from 1996 to 1998. The overall average hung jury rate
for the jurisdictions was 6.2 percent." National Center for State Courts, Jury Decision-
Making FAQs, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/FAQs/JurDecFAQ.htm (last
modified on July 18, 2005).
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rule; that is what due process requires
112
- would harmonize American practice with other
common law nations
Cons:
" hung juries still result
" nullification may happen more easily than
Americans are comfortable with-and
too much nullification undermines the
rule of law
" less deliberation may hapen than it would
under unanimity 11
" deliberations may become verdict-centered
rather than evidence-centered
" jurors will feel less satisfied with their verdicts,
and will be more combative and more
closed-minded
" there is no obvious proper supermajority rule:
why should 10-2 be any more desirable
than 9-3 or 8-4? Unanimity and majority
are bright-line rules and seem more
principled
" as a criminal defendant, each citizen would
probably want a unanimity rule
" minority members may be less likely to speak
under supermajority rules than under
unanimity because their voice may
become irrelevant'
14
Rule: Asymmetrical Supermajority
Theorists and Proponents: Menard11 /Courts
martial'
16
Pros:
" does away with all hung juries.
" only asymmetry gives effect to assuming
innocence
" nullification is easier to achieved, allowing more
112. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
113. Diamond et al., supra note 17.
114. Smith, supra note 79, at 523.
115. Richard H. Menard, Jr., Note, Ten Reasonable Men, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 179
(2001) (arguing for a 10-2 one-way rule).
116. See supra note 9.
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information to get to the state about the
citizenry's preferences
" prosecutors would not try to overextend with
charges, serving as a check upon the
practice of over-charging
" the threat of the criminal actually going free is
enough of an incentive for jurors to take a
searching look and deliberate
" on the European Continent, all juries use one-
way rules'
1 7
Cons:
" may encourage prosecutor to under-charge
" nullifying will be too easy
" symmetry seems fairer
" Americans don't actually assume innocence; it
is only a heuristic.
Rule: Majority
Theorists and Proponents: Schwartz &
Schwartz1 8
Pros:
- does away with all hung juries (except 6-6
votes)
- since only 'close' cases fail to achieve
unanimity, majority rule is only necessary
for a few hard cases for which it can
provide repose
- selection rules are unfair and are often used to
frustrate a verdict; this would be made
difficult under majority rule
- if the fair cross-section requirement of the jury is
to be taken seriously, challenges must be
restricted and majority rule should prevail
- insincere voting is prevalent with other rules
both as to guilt and lesser included
offenses1 19
117. Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 102, at 446-47 (citing local laws).
118. Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 102.
119. On preference falsification more generally, see KURAN, supra note 15 and
SUNSTEIN, supra note 15. Even Shari Diamond's study, discussed supra note 17, which is
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" this decision rule is consistent with the
presumed American preference for
majority rule and has been adopted by
countries on the Continent, Scotland,
Latin America, and Russia
120
" in groups assigned an objective problem-solving
task, majority rule may be better at
neutralizing inequalities of influence
within the group
121
" if the vision of the jury as a mini-legislature has
any purchase, majority rule is the norm
" hung juries are a bigger problem than many
think
" current fair cross-section requirements produce
disagreement and the need for new,
more pluralist rules
1 22
" reinforces centrism1
23
" deliberation will happen because the minority is
always close to victory1 24
Cons:
" we should discourage thinking of the jury as a
site of pluralism, only truth-seeking
" the rule minimizes deliberation because it
would only be necessary in 6-6 splits
" supermajority rules already get rid of most
hung juries so there is no good reason
to relax the rule further
" just because those who serve are more diverse
doesn't mean simple majorities are
sufficient; even under pluralism, some
targeted to support unanimity rules in the context of the civil jury, shows evidence of
preference falsification by minority jurors.
120. Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 102, at 447 (citing local laws).
121. The robustness of this finding is a matter of debate. See Mendelberg, supra note
47, at 40 (citing G. Falk, An Empirical Study Measuring Conflict in Problem-Solving
Groups Which Are Assigned Different Decision Rules, 35 HUM. REL. 1123 (1982); G. Falk
& S. Falk, The Impact of Decision Rules on the Distribution of Power in Problem-Solving
Teams with Unequal Power, 6 GROUP & ORG. STUD. 211 (1981)).
122. Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 102, at 448-49 (citing ABRAMSON, supra note 3,
at 99; Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1862-1869, 1871 (2000)).
123. Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 102, at 454. It does this by letting the median
voter have her way.
124. Id. at 455.
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consensus-building institutions are
desirable
- while Socrates' jury used majority rule, it had
500 jurors; the small size of modern
juries re-commends a more stringent
voting rule
126
-minority members of mock juries assigned a
majority decision rule are particularly
dissatisfied with group deliberation
127
IV. An Argument To Support a Supermajority Rule for
Conviction (and a Majority Rule for Acquittal) for the
American Criminal Jury
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have been writing
articles for a decade spelling out the advantages of supermajority
rules in the legislative domain, especially in the context of self-
imposed rules by Congress to require three-fifth voting
supermajorities to increase income tax rates and/or federal
spending.' 8 Recently, they have concentrated their efforts to discuss
"our supermajoritarian Constitution, 1 29 arguing that "the central
principle underlying the Constitution is governance through
supermajority rules.... Supermajoritarianism is [] a means of
promoting the more general constitutional principle of promot[ing]
the public good within a system of popular representation. " I wish
125. See R. ALLEN, SOCRATES AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 56, 135 n. 24 (1980)
(Socrates was convicted by a vote of 280-220); R. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN
ANCIENT ATHENS 36, 255 (1927) (Socrates was convicted by 501 jurors; he lost by 61
votes).
126. This argument is suggested by Levmore, Parliamentary Law, supra note 64, at
975. He continues: "Note that as a probabilistic matter, a simple majority of a very large
number of voters may be said to be correct at least as much as a supermajority of a smaller
group." Id. at 975 n. 12 (citing Kuflik, Majority Rule Procedure, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS
XVIII 305-06 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1977)).
127. Kerr et al., supra note 10.
128. See the sources cited supra note 32.
129. McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 32.
130. Id. at 705. King's work has also focused on the supermajoritarian character of the
Constitution. See the sources cited supra note 33. Others take as their focus
supermajority rules in congressional procedure. See in this regard the sources cited supra
note 21. Obviously, the renewed interest in the filibuster and cloture rules has generated
much more attention to supermajority rules of late, especially as they pertain to the
appointments process. See generally McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 21; Wible, supra
note 21.
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to endorse their account here and characterize the American
constitutional regime as supermajoritarian. This constitutional
preference, I argue, militates against implementing a simple majority
or unanimous jury decision rule for conviction in American criminal
courts and supports the argument for a supermajority rule by showing
it to be a proper and attractive baseline. In turn, this argument shifts
the burden back upon those who wish to depart from it. However,
owing to asymmetric costs associated with conviction and acquittal, I
find a departure from supermajority rule warranted in the case of
acquittal. First I make my affirmative case (IV.A); I then respond to
some potential objections (IV.B).
A. "Our Supermajoritarian Constitution" and Why It Recommends a
Supermajority Rule for Conviction by the Criminal Jury:
Coherentism
Let me list the constitutional provisions that are explicitly
supermajoritarian in the order of appearance in the document:
1. Officials and judges cannot be convicted in impeachment
proceedings without a two-thirds vote in the Senate."'
2. Expulsion from Congress requires a two-thirds vote of the
relevant house.132
3. Veto overrides require a two-thirds vote in each house.
4. Deadlock in the Electoral College cannot be broken by the
House of Representatives without a two-thirds quorum of states.'
5. Ratification of treaties requires a two-thirds approval by the
Senate.135
6. Amending the Constitution requires a two-thirds vote of
Congress for proposal and a three-fourths supermajority of states for
ratification.136
7. Ratification of the Constitution itself required nine of thirteen
states.
137
8. Persons who served in office and then joined the Confederacy
were unable to undertake various offices without a two-thirds vote of
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
132. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
133. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
134. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (amended by id. amend. XII).
135. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
136. U.S. CONST. art. V.
137. Id. art. VII.
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both houses.13
9. Congress may approve a suspension of the President for
inability to serve over his objection by a two-thirds supermajority
vote.139
About these provisions, McGinnis and Rappaport correctly note
that:
these supermajority rules are not restricted to small or
unimportant parts of the Constitution. They involve some of
the most significant matters that affect the structure of the
polity and the nation's political stability... They also apply in a
wide variety of areas (e.g., foreign and domestic affairs,
constitutional and personnel matters) and apply to a broad
range of bodies.14 °
Yet it would be too quick to characterize the American regime as
supermajoritarian on the basis of these provisions alone. Congress
still ostensibly uses majorities for most legislation (except when it
needs to overcome the filibuster),14' and most judicial panels decide
their cases with majority rule (even though the judiciary's check on
majority rule is one of the best arguments against thinking of
constitutional democracies as majoritarian). '42 Supermajority rules
exist elsewhere in the document, however, in places that aren't as
easy to see.
McGinnis and Rappaport argue (consistent with a view held by
many political scientists) that bicameralism functions like a
supermajority rule because different constituencies elect the members
of the two chambers and different deliberative processes and trades
must be made to get the support of the respective houses.1 43 As Julian
138. Id. amend. XIV, § 3.
139. Id. amend. XXV, § 4.
140. McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 32, at
712.
141. See generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 181 (1997). The political scientists cited supra note 21 also address the way the
filibuster and the committee structure may be conceived as non-majoritarian.
142. I suppose it is also fair to say that appellate judicial panels regularly use a two-
thirds supermajority rule, since divided three-member courts split 2-1. En banc courts in
the federal system decide by majority, however. See FED. R. APP. PR. 35.
143. McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 32, at
712-15 (citing BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 29, at 233-48; MUELLER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 34 , at 193-95; William T. Mayton, The
Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of
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Eule argues, "Bicameralism forces majorities to seek broader
coalitions. It imposes something like a supermajoritarian voting
rule."'" As I suggested earlier, Lijphart also considers American
bicameralism distinctly nonmajoritarian because the Senate over-
represents small states.1
4
1
McGinnis and Rappaport even argue that presentment
effectively sets up a tricameralism for legislation, as the President is
elected by yet a third constituency whose term, cycle of election, and
bundle of preferences differ from the voters' congressional
representatives; this necessitates the coalition-building that is often
considered one of supermajoritarianism's advantages.'46
More, McGinnis and Rappaport expose the 'absolute'
prohibitions of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution (no ex post
facto laws, no titles of nobility, etc.) as themselves supermajority
rules, since they are all amendable through Article V's supermajority
procedures.1'7  Finally, McGinnis and Rappaport prove just how
entrenched these supermajoritarian rules are or were in state
constitutions and other legal institutions in the United States, as well
as show just how many more supermajoritarian rules were proposed
at the Constitutional Convention. I need not restate their arguments
in full. In sum, "the introduction of supermajority rules [] represents
Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 956; John F. Manning,
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74-75 (2001)).
144. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1557
(1990).
145. LIJPHART, supra note 31, at 190. See also Richard N. Rosenfeld, What
Democracy? The Case for Abolishing the United States Senate, 308 HARPER'S MAG. 35
(May 2004) (arguing that overrepresentation of small states recommends abolition of the
Senate).
146. McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 32, at
715-16.
147. Id. at 716-17. I'll have to leave to one side Amar's idea that the Constitution can
be amended outside of Article V with simple majorities. See generally Akhil Reed Amar,
The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 457 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1043 (1988). For the good reasons to ignore Amar,
see King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical Context, Popular Sovereignty, and
Supermajority Rules, supra note 33; and Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original
Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996).
Furthermore, whatever we make of Ackerman's esotericism in elaborating how to
spot "constitutional moments," 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998), his original notion of revolutionary politics being of
constitutional magnitude surely left room for the contributions of supermajorities and
consensus, even if the formal requirements of Article V could not be met. See 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 230-94 (1991).
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one of the distinctive contributions of the United States to the science
of constitutionalism.' ' 1 8  This perspective reinforces the
supermajoritarian nature of American governance. '
But does this characterization of the United States as
supermajoritarian have any implications for the choice of decision
rule in the criminal jury context? While the analyses in Parts II and
III showed many parallels in considerations between regime decision
rule choice and jury decision rule choice, the lists just as surely
showed that many new factors surface in the particularized context of
the jury. What McGinnis and Rappaport haven't done-and what I
do here-is use the American commitment to supermajoritarianism
to bolster the argument to require supermajority rules in the criminal
jury for conviction. I wish to offer a "coherentist" account, if only to
show that there is nothing anomalous about this choice as a baseline,
even if others ultimately offer good reasons to depart from it.
Obviously, I cannot argue that the Constitution requires a
supermajority rule for conviction in the criminal jury, only that such a
rule is consistent with the Constitution's general structure and can be
made coherent by thinking through how and why the Constitution has
staked out the decision rules that it has. Unanimity and
majoritarianism don't have this going for them. A unanimity
requirement appears nowhere in the Constitution: the ones from the
Articles of Confederation, requiring unanimity for ratification and
amendment,150 were explicitly rejected in favor of supermajority rules.
And when the jury provisions were written into the Bill of Rights, the
framers refused to specify the unanimity rule prevalent at the time;
Apodaca found this omission to have a "substantive effect. 15' Many
positive reasons for adopting a supermajoritarian rule are listed in the
executive summary in Part III. Furthermore, because of the
supermajoritarian nature of our Constitution we should be even more
comfortable with the departure from simple majoritarianism and
unanimity in the context of criminal jury convictions.
However, the American constitutional structure does indeed
resort to majority rule more than occasionally. Yet the underlying
theory of supermajority rules gives the institutional designer some
148. McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 32, at
721.
149. Id. at 717-19 nn. 58-62.
150. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION pmbl., art. III, & art. IX.
151. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972) (citing Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 96-97 (1970)).
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guidelines in figuring out when supermajority rules are appropriate
and when majority rule should suffice; I have suggested that we
should try to weigh the costs outlined in Part II.C when taking to the
task of decision rule design. While it would be tiresome and
unnecessary to rehearse how these costs recommend the
supermajority rules actually selected by the Constitutional
Convention (because McGinnis and Rappaport do it quite nicely),'52
perhaps explaining one will provide the reader with a feel for how the
analysis goes, facilitating my application of these cost considerations
to the criminal jury. Recall from Part II that these costs include error
costs, decision costs, personal costs, and transaction costs.
Consider the provisions in the Constitution for the impeachment
of judges and officers, requiring a two-thirds supermajority for
conviction in the Senate. It is worth noting in the first instance that
this is an asymmetrical rule: failure to achieve the supermajority leads
to an "acquittal" of sorts (though I suppose a failure to convict could
be followed up with future impeachments). Accordingly, the
Constitution furnishes some support for the idea that
supermajoritarian rules needn't be symmetric for conviction and
acquittal; this constitutional provision supports my ultimate
endorsement of an asymmetrical rule.
This decision rule choice can be illuminated by a consideration of
error costs. "The [f]ramers had a plausible ground for requiring a
stringent supermajority rule because of the asymmetry of dangers:
convicting wrongly on impeachment is more dangerous to the
republic than mistakenly failing to convict because wrongful
convictions could threaten the independence of the President and
judiciary and lead to partisan, destabilizing cycles of reprisals." '153
American constitutional design remained sensitive to the reality that
a majority rule for impeachment would too easily threaten the
stability and integrity of the political sphere; if pluralism were allowed
to have its way in removing officers, the regime could not function
efficiently because too much partisanship and instability could
undermine the adjudicatory context.
On the other hand, unanimity would not allow room for political
judgment, central to the impeachment proceeding: "A supermajority
152. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 32, at
750-91 (executing the analysis for impeachment, expulsion, the treaty power,
bicameralism, adoption, and amendment, using some (but not all) of the cost
considerations offered here).
153. Id. at 750.
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rule provide[s] a method of infusing political judgment into
impeachment while tempering political partisanship and preserving
independence." 1 4 This compromise was struck because the errors
associated with 'false positives'-convicting innocent officials-was
deemed more important to avoid than extra decision costs, which are
higher when the threshold is increased from majority rule and lower
when decreased from unanimity.
Personal cost considerations may have also played a role in the
decision rule adopted for impeachment. The members of the
Constitutional Convention surely saw themselves as potential-if
they were not already-office-holders and party members.
Accordingly, they were aware that whatever rule they chose might
directly influence their prospects or the prospects of their party for
surviving impeachment trials. Against this background, their choice
of supermajority rules makes sense: while majority rule would enable
easy removal, unanimity would be too high a threshold for each
member to feel that removal of truly guilty officials would happen
when necessary. To be sure, as McGinnis and Rappaport note, "the
case for supermajority rule for convictions on impeachment might
have been even stronger when the Constitution was originally written
than it is today," ' because now the Vice-President is usually a
member of the same party as the President. Alas, removing a
President leaves the same party in control of the Executive and this
was not always so.
Finally, consideration of transaction costs-understood here as
the side payments necessary to get a result through the decision rule
threshold-again recommends a role for a supermajority rule in the
impeachment context because majority blocs are easier to manipulate
and corrupt (through campaign contributions to parties) than are
broad-based supermajoritarian coalitions. Since the principal worry
is with false positives rather than with false negatives, transaction cost
considerations are less relevant in the context of preventing an
impeachment; it would be easiest to prevent an impeachment under
unanimity and hardest under majoritarianism; supermajoritarianism
is a clean compromise choice on this dimension.
While I could try to carry out this analysis for every
supermajoritarian feature in the Constitution, I hope by now I have
established both that the Constitution has a generalized preference
for supermajoritarian voting rules and that there is some underlying
154. Id. at 752.
155. Id. at 753.
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theory of decision rule selection that can guide a particularized
institutional choice. The only question that remains is whether the
jury is an institution that can be fruitfully analyzed with the
framework of the cost considerations explored here.
Let me consider error costs first. It is a standard mantra of
American life that convicting the innocent is substantially more costly
to a polity's legitimacy than letting the guilty go free; the costs are
asymmetric and treating people as innocent until proven guilty is an
'attractive baseline."56 This fact alone recommends a departure from
simple majority rule in the direction of supermajorities. However,
letting the guilty go free too often-more likely to occur when the
threshold for conviction is more stringent than majority rule-
presents error costs of its own: if too many guilty go free (as might be
argued can also happen under unanimity because hung juries often
result in the prosecution giving up), there are costs associated with
the diminished legitimacy associated with an inefficient legal system
that fails to punish wrongdoers. A supermajority rule might strike the
right balance, and that calculation has normative significance.
Likewise, this calculation suggests a simple majority rule for
acquittals: we want an efficient way to bring government accusation
to a close in the criminal context, especially if agreement cannot be
reached that the state is correct and that the defendant should be
punished. If we keep the decision rule too difficult to achieve for
acquittal, we do not properly respect the attractive baseline of the
presumption of innocence. Although sustained failures to achieve a
conviction may lead to effective exoneration in the press and by the
prosecution's failure to continue to prosecute, the repose and
acquittal that the innocent deserve counsel us to depart from
supermajoritarianism in the direction of majoritarian rules to reach
verdicts of not guilty.
Decision costs in the context of the jury come in various forms.
First, they come in the form of time: it can take a long time to get a
unanimous verdict-and if hung juries are allowed, the time
associated with subsequent trials must be considered as well. Second,
decision costs may be assessed through considering the efficiency in
getting a verdict that would likely be achieved under a less time-
intensive decision rule. They also may come in the form of
compromise verdicts, where juries convict on lesser-included offenses
just to get the minority to go along with the verdict. Finally, they may
156. For an interesting and entertaining rumination on letting the guilty go free, see
Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997).
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come in the form of juror preference falsification or juror refusal to
fully deliberate and reveal information garnered throughout the trial.
Decision costs of all these sorts seem potentially at their highest
under a two-way unanimity rule, which will likely produce lengthier
deliberations and more hung juries. Moreover, most unanimous
verdicts reflect a vote that could have been achieved much more
quickly under a different decision rule. Under unanimity rules, if a
supermajority can be achieved by an early poll, the verdict will almost
always ultimately reflect that supermajority. "7 Since hung juries
generally raise decision costs, two-way unanimity rules probably
perform the worst under that register, since more hung juries are
associated with that rule than under any other. Still, some think the
trade-off worthwhile because unanimity would likely lead to more
deliberation and more revealed private information all things
considered.
Ultimately, decision costs are relatively high under any
symmetrical rule (supermajorities included). Symmetrical majority
rule, in fact, can also have unexpectedly high decision costs-even
though one might think otherwise because it is very easy to form a
mere majority on a first ballot-because under such a rule,
deliberations may actually alter one or two votes and that may be all
that is necessary for a change in the verdict. This is one of the most
interesting suggestions offered by those in favor of majority rule in
the criminal jury: by keeping the votes necessary for conviction and
acquittal close, the rule can incentivize deliberation and keep the net
decision costs relatively low (even if it takes a long time) because the
verdict could not have been produced with less effort.158
These considerations recommend both against symmetrical
supermajority and unanimity rules and for keeping the tally needed
for conviction close to that needed for acquittal. By doing so,
preference falsification can be minimized and the revelation of
private information can be maximized because only a small number
157. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 488. We don't know if the
superminority is really convinced or whether they just falsify their preferences because
they realize they have no chance of 'winning;' their only hope would be to hold out and
hang the jury, something that may be third-best to the dissenters, who would rather reach
a verdict than stay three extra days, say, just to get a hung jury result.
158. See generally Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 102. It would be an interesting
empirical exercise to test whether countries with majority decision rules actually save
decision costs-or whether because one vote can really make a difference, jurors are
willing to argue with one another for longer. The latter assumption coheres with the idea
that jurors are only willing to get involved in the deliberations if they can see themselves
or one another as a pivotal voter. See Feddersen & Pesendorfer, supra note 18.
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of jurors need to change their mind to change the verdict; and
deliberation would naturally result from such decision rules.
Accordingly, I argue for supermajority rules for convictions and
majority rules for acquittals: we may pay a price in one form of
decision cost but we achieve a net benefit because the decision will
much more likely be the product of authentic preferences (the
dissenters never need to lie about their preferred verdict) and
authentic deliberation (the rules being close ensures that the minority
has a real chance to get their desired result simply by changing a few
minds).
I have already explained how personal costs can be analyzed in
the jury context in Part II.C. There, I suggested that countervailing
considerations militate against both unanimity and majority rule,
which parallels the discussion of impeachment above: a citizen might
want a strict decision rule as applied to herself, but not want to be
subject to too many acquitted criminals in the midst of her
community; a supermajority rule for conviction is a good compromise
with normative significance. Personal cost considerations also
highlight why my proposed hybrid makes sense: we are likely to want
heightened agreement requirements for our convictions but would
generally be satisfied with a somewhat relaxed standard for our
achieving an acquittal.
Finally, consideration of transaction costs-here, buying off juror
votes-focuses our attention on whether we are more worried about
ill-intentioned people trying to buying convictions or about
defendants trying to buy themselves acquittals or hung juries. It is
probably fair to say that (unlike the impeachment context) more
people are worried about corruption coming from defendant-buyers
who would like to get an acquittal or a series of hung juries than they
are worried about people in the market to buy convictions against
their enemies and competitors. This is likely why most people seem
not to favor asymmetrical rules that allow defendants to go free
simply upon a failure to reach unanimity or a supermajority. Not
only do we worry about a few odd holdouts getting defendants
acquittals, but we also worry about potential corruption.
Given these considerations, supermajoritarian rules for
conviction seem preferable to unanimity rules: requiring all jurors to
agree allows defendants to find one loose link to stand in the way of
their own conviction through corruption; and unanimity too easily
allows a single hold out (who may or may not be sensible) to hold up
a verdict. But these considerations just as surely recommend two
other conclusions: that some critical mass be necessary to reach an
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acquittal verdict and that a substantial critical mass be necessary to
reach a conviction verdict so it is not too easy to buy. Since the costs
are presumed to be asymmetric (and we wish to give some weight to
the presumption of innocence), supermajority rules for conviction
seem most appropriate and majority rule for acquittals seems
warranted.
In conclusion, taking all these considerations into account against
the background of a general predilection for supermajority rules in
American constitutional and political culture recommends a
supermajority rule for conviction in the criminal jury context. Yet,
since the cost analysis yields certain asymmetries between the
decision rules for conviction and for acquittal, a particular kind of
asymmetrical decision rule may be most consistent with the theory of
supermajority rules, one that has not been offered before in the long-
running debate about appropriate decision rules for the American
criminal jury:159 mere majorities should be given the power to acquit
and a supermajority should be required for convictions. In the first
place, asymmetrical rules are good for minimizing the extra costs
associated with hung juries. Usually, those who offer asymmetrical
rules want to do away with hung juries altogether. Given that there is
evidence that a symmetrical supermajority rule produces a hanging
rate of .4%,1" the hybrid rule I offer will likely produce even fewer
hung juries because only a very few vote tallies would be considered
inconclusive. Moreover, the hybrid I offer here will provide
superminority blocs for acquittal a real chance to get their desired
verdict, incentivizing deliberation and discouraging preference
falsification, two cardinal virtues that any reform proposal should
inculcate-virtues that those in the majoritarian camp appropriately
emphasize. Finally, my hybrid rule would give some effect to the
presumption of innocence Americans wish to claim as a foundation
for their system of criminal justice. While the supermajoritarianism
promulgated by the Constitution recommends a supermajority rule
for conviction, the implicit cost considerations of decision rule
selection encourage the institutional designer to adopt a simple
159. Russia and Spain, two countries whose criminal juries are the newest among the
civilized countries, both recently selected asymmetrical rules that are not radically
different from the ultimate conclusion I endorse here: In Spain, 7 out of 9 votes are
required for unfavorable decisions against defendants and 5 out of 9 votes are required for
favorable decisions; in Russia, a guilty verdict requires 7 out of 12 votes, while not guilty
verdicts require 6 out of 12 votes. See Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury Systems:
The Cases of Spain and Russia, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 319 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000).
160. Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 102, at 438.
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majority rule for acquittal.
Now that I have arrived at the end of my affirmative case, it
should be plain that my coherentist account carries normative weight
only to set up a presumption. I have concluded that the presumption
should hold in the institutional context of the jury and that the burden
should shift to those who wish to support other rules. There is
nothing anomalous about supermajority rules-and the reasons our
Constitution opts for them generally provide particularized reasons
for the American criminal jury system to embrace them as well. I
parry some objections in the next sections of this Article.
B. Possible Objections
1. Are You Playing Word Games with Me?
First, one might argue that a more broadly conceived
supermajoritarianism bolsters the unanimity requirement because
unanimity is itself a form of supermajority rule. As McGinnis and
Rappaport themselves acknowledge, there are many different forms
and levels of supermajority rule, and the unanimity requirement
might still be justified for the jury as an especially rigorous
supermajority rule for a special legal entity. Although this seems like
a promising argument for those who just can't give up on unanimity,
the framers and other political scientists understand that the political
theory supporting supermajority and unanimity rules are clearly
different and that the Constitution opts for no unanimity rules. '61
From the opposite direction, it could be argued that using
majority rule in criminal juries could itself be considered a
supermajority rule because the judge usually has discretion to set
aside a verdict. Just like presentment to the President, which
161. I would be remiss if I failed to mention that congressional procedures do seem to
contain a few provisions that contemplate unanimity. There is a "Consent Calendar,"
"which consists of bills involving spending of less than $1 million on [other] Calendar[s]
that a member anticipates will be passed by unanimous consent. Minor bills on the
Consent Calendar are considered by the House twice a month." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY 31 (3d ed. 2001). Additionally, "[tihere is no Rules Committee in the
Senate, and expedited consideration [of bills] is usually accomplished by a unanimous
consent agreement (Senate Rule V). Like a House rule, a unanimous consent agreement is
a roadmap for the bill's consideration: when it may be brought up, what amendments may
be proposed, and how much time may be spent on it. Unlike a House rule, a Senate
unanimous consent agreement must be acceptable to all Senators; the objection of a single
Senator torpedoes it." Id. at 32. Obviously, these provisions for unanimity only work
because they are used for ministerial functions and they are not constitutional in nature or
gravity.
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McGinnis and Rappaport consider suggestive of an implicit
supermajority rule, the further protection of the judge could be
viewed as supermajoritarian; two can play at this semantic game, the
camp for 'majority' rule might say.
The first rejoinder is perhaps too evasive: if simple majority rule
checked by the judiciary were the current rule, or one with a serious
chance of adoption, my supermajoritarian perspective might also
bless that decision rule. But I hope I was able to show that the
preference for supermajoritarianism within the jury is principled and
is not merely endorsed because of a completely generalized
commitment to supermajoritarianism. In any case, since the real
problem diagnosed here is the persistence of the unanimity rule, I
hope exposing the polity to be supermajoritarian is instructive.
Second, an 'internal' majoritarianism results in substantial
pathologies (see the lists in Parts II and III for a summary);
irrespective of the potential for an external check, majority rule
within the jury has undesirable consequences that an 'internal'
supermajoritarianism can help cure.
The judge, finally, is very differently situated from the jury: she
can only force an acquittal and never a conviction-and there is a
wide power disparity among the institutional actors (for juries can
never override a judge's directed acquittal and judges can never take
part in juror deliberations). Even if "[i]t is useful to think of the
relationship of the judge and jury in a criminal trial as a system of
checks and balances,"1 62 the internal decision-making process of the
jury should trigger a supermajoritarian rule for conviction.
2. Will You Commit Yourself to a Number Already?
The previous objection has revealed that the
supermajoritarianism advocated here suggests nothing about what the
proper numerical rule should be. Showing the Constitution to
sanction a wide range of supermajority rules does not help guide us in
divining the right supermajoritarian vote tally that should be
required: I have furnished no reason to prefer 8-4 (two-thirds)
verdicts over 9-3 (three-fourths) verdicts or 10-2 verdicts over 11-1
verdicts. This is the slippery slope argument supermajoritarians hear
often: "Any theory that might justify the use of a three-fifths (60%)
or two-thirds (66.6%) decision rule should be equally effective at
justifying a nine-tenths (90%) decision rule, or even the rule of a
162. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 417.
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single person (99.9999%).,,163 While this argument might have
purchase if I were looking to endorse a particular rule, in the current
context it is beside the point: all I aim to show is that the choice for
supermajority rules for conviction by criminal juries ought to be
preferred to unanimity and majority rule, and that supermajority
rules should be the baseline, using the cost analysis highlighted here
as a guide for when supermajoritarian rules should be adopted. The
particulars of that rule should be settled by the standard democratic
(supermajoritarian!) channels.
3. Isn't the Jury an Institution of Other-Government, Triggering a
Different Decision Rule from Institutions of Self-Government?
Richard Primus's argument for unanimity rests heavily on the
insight that juries are doing something quite different from the
decision-making processes that take place in legislatures. Whereas
majoritarianism makes sense in the context of self-government, he
argues, other-government-adjudicating others' fates-should
require a more rigorous decision rule, where the potential to get the
facts right can be maximized.'6 I have included elements of this
argument in my analyses in Parts II and III.
Primus, however, makes two mistakes: First, nothing in Primus's
argument affirmatively shows that unanimity is the proper decision
rule; all it does is show how unanimity can be explained away as not
particularly counter-majoritarian, given a theory of democratic
governance that requires consensus on fact questions (a highly
idealized theory of democracy, to be sure). As I've already noted,
juries do much more than decide questions of fact,'16 and there is no
good argument for why a consensus requirement cannot be met with
supermajoritarian rules. On the contrary, to avoid the compromises
and preference falsification unanimity inspires, supermajoritarianism
may be more consistent with Primus's ultimate desiderata.
Second, since adjudication is always other-government, Primus
should expect unanimity as the decision rule in all adjudicatory
contexts. Yet, he does not explain why the Supreme Court or Courts
of Appeals do not need to decide with unanimity when entertaining
disputes involving mixed questions of law and fact.' 66 Nor does he
163. King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical Context, Popular Sovereignty, and
Supermajority Rules, supra note 33, at 611.
164. Primus, supra note 80, at 1422-25.
165. See supra note 11.
166. For an argument that voting rules on the Supreme Court should be changed to
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explain why the Senate, when it sits as a court of impeachment, need
only reach a supermajoritarian decision. In each of these cases,
Primus's theory of other-government should trigger his unanimity
rule. Accordingly, I don't think the argument distinguishing self-
government from other-government ultimately supports the
unanimity rule.
4. Isn't Non-Coherence the Rule in Other Countries Too?
A comparativist might wish to see if jury decision rules in
"consensual" and "majoritarian" democracies correlate in any way. 16 7
If consensual regimes tend to have supermajority decision rules in the
criminal jury, my emphasis on our supermajoritarian Constitution
might make sense; my coherentist instinct could be vindicated.
A cursory analysis, however, produces the following curious
result: paradigmatic majoritarian regimes-New Zealand, the United
Kingdom, and Ireland-use supermajority verdicts, while
paradigmatic consensual regimes-Belgium and Italy-use majority
rule in the criminal jury context.' 6' The Fifth Republic of France is
now considered majoritarian (Lijphart originally classified it as
consensual), but it has supermajority rules for the jury. 69 This would
seem to be something slightly more than anecdotal evidence that a
regime's type (in Lijphart's classic typology anyway) correlates with a
jury decision rule that diverges from its general regime-type.
Accordingly, if I have described the United States to be something
like a consensual regime, a simple majority decision rule should be
predicted.17 No other country uses unanimity.
But is there any normative force to this finding of correlation?
require supermajorities (at least for invalidating acts of Congress), see MAX BOOT, OUT
OF ORDER 206 (1998); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving
Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893 (2003); and Evan H.
Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule:
Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L. J. 73 (2003). None of these authors use the general
supermajoritarian nature of the American polity to offer their arguments.
167. I use the typology of LIJPHART, supra note 31, at 216 tbl. 13.2. For this purpose, it
seems fair to collapse supermajoritarian and consensual democracies, though I do not wish
to assimilate them. See Part II.D.
168. The information about foreign jury decision rules is taken from Schwartz &
Schwartz, supra note 102.
169. See Rein Taagepera, Arend Lijphart and the Dimensions of Democracy, in
DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 75, 82.
170. Actually, Lijphart ultimately classifies the United States as a majoritarian regime,
which may predict a supermajoritarian jury rule. Remember, though, that Lijphart offers
the United States "as the most prominent example of a mixed majoritarian-consensual
type of democracy." LIJPHART, supra note 31, at 36.
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An interesting post hoc rationalization might be offered: Since
electoral minorities have greater access and veto power in the general
legislative process under consensual regimes, minorities in jury
deliberations (who may be from the same electoral minorities) get
less protection in the administration of the laws through the use of
supermajority rules in the jury; conversely, if simple majorities have
lawmaking power, more protections are be built into the "back end"
in the form of supermajority requirements to apply the law in the jury
context.
While this explanation seems sensible, it is not historically
informed: Lijphart's majoritarian regimes tend to emerge from the
British tradition and his consensual regimes tend to emerge from the
Continental tradition. This etiology is relevant because the separate
traditions inherit very different jury systems, which predate their
democratic forms; accordingly, their starting points may explain much
more than their current regime type. Indeed, Louisiana, one of only
two states to experiment with supermajority verdicts in the criminal
context, inherited a civil law system rather than the common law
system, where unanimity was presumed to be the proper rule. Other
historical variables may be producing the seeming anomaly and it is
unlikely that institutional designers think enough about how their
jury rules cohere with their regime-type and decision rules in political
life more generally.'71 Indeed, that is part of the point of the
argument I am trying to make here: not enough attention is paid to
harmonizing jury decision rules with general regime rules. An
asymmetrical supermajority jury decision rule (facilitating majority
acquittals) would harmonize nicely with American constitutional
norms and values.
5. Can't the Incoherence Be Defended?
But perhaps the post hoc rationalization I hypothesized above
was so attractive that it can be used against me. Perhaps
supermajoritarianism throughout the American legislative process
suggests that mere majorities can be trusted in the context of the
criminal jury because supermajorities in politics ensure that electoral
minorities are protected.
171. In e-mail correspondences with Ian Shapiro and Bruce Ackerman (February 22,
2003), both agreed that the anomaly could probably be explained by the historical account
offered above. More, what the correlation predicts suggests nothing about what is
normatively desirable or what is coherent. In any case, the small-n problem with many
confounding variables counsels against being too political science-y about this here.
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My answer to this challenge is as follows: The governmental
institutions that make law-even when 'consensual'-are institutions
controlled by elites.12 If the jury, on the other hand, is a populist
institution,'73 its decision rule should not be relaxed in service of what
goes on at the elite level of decision-making-at the very least,
protections built in for the elite representatives should not get a
government out of putting real power into the hands of the people
through the jury and its populist ideal. Instead, the decision rule
should be harmonized with the general regime type, especially if the
implicit cost considerations themselves warrant conformity with the
presumption for supermajoritarianism. In the American case, I have
urged that the presumption holds for conviction but not for acquittal.
Let us not fool ourselves: whether the United States is
supermajoritarian or not, American electoral minorities still fare
pretty badly in the criminal jury context and probably require the
benefit of a supermajority rule for conviction rather than a simple
majority rule. By the same token, criminal defendants who are not
found guilty by a supermajority of their peers deserve the repose and
the closure of actually being acquitted; accordingly, we should change
the decision rule for acquittal to a simply majority requirement.
V. Conclusion
Perhaps, by way of summary and conclusion, it would be useful
to highlight the best case that can be made for my proposed decision
rule, synthesizing the insights of Parts III and IV. First, and most
directly related to the thesis here, a supermajoritarian rule for
conviction would harmonize our jury decision rule with the decision
rules prevalent in political and constitutional life more generally (as
well as with the rules prevalent in other common law countries and
newer polities that have more self-consciously picked jury decision
rules anew). To be sure, there are unique features of the jury that
may counsel for departure from the decision rules in political and
constitutional life. But I presume here that the jury is a political
institution through and through-and it is becoming even more so as
we recruit more diverse members of our communities to serve, as we
172. Lijphart's enthusiasm for consensualism at the law-making level is often diffused
by his critics, who are eager to point out that the only consent consensual democracies
garner is the consent of the elite; accordingly, consensus democracy is rarely populist
enough. See, e.g., Wilsford, supra note 71, at 2.
173. For more on the jury as a "populist protector," see, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83 (1998).
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make it more difficult to avoid jury service, and as we make it harder
and harder to challenge jurors lawyers may not like. There is no
question that the stakes are high when the criminal jury issues
verdicts: a person's liberty is often at stake (if not their life). Yet, the
general laws under which law-abiding citizen live undeniably coerce
us every day.
Admittedly, there is likely a perception that "legitimacy" gains
accrue from having verdicts that require unanimous agreement. Still,
I have suggested here that there are three reasons to be suspicious of
the appearance of "certainty" unanimity furnishes. First, most
empirical evidence concludes that the verdicts reached under various
decision rules do not vary in any dramatic way: unanimity
requirements seem to produce the same number of convictions that
supermajority requirements do. Second, there is empirical evidence
that people assigned a unanimous decision rule will often agree to
decide by supermajority (albeit unanimously). Finally, there is
substantial evidence that people are willing to falsify their
preferences-and the incentives for doing so are especially high when
one is a holdout juror. For all these reasons, our security in the
"certainty" afforded by unanimity should be questioned. In fact,
because supermajorities may have less incentive to "compromise" to
win the support of holdouts, greater accuracy might be accomplished
through supermajority rules.
To the extent that one likes unanimity not for actual help in
getting the right answers but because one thinks it is good PR for the
jury system, I do not have an easy rebuttal. It may be true that the
public associates unanimity with legitimacy-but I have argued here
that this is not a well-founded association to make. No other modern
country has such stringent rules; we don't have such rules in the
context of the civil jury or courts martial; and the few states that have
experimented with relaxed jury decision rules for the criminal jury do
not show evidence of especial legitimacy deficits (or efforts to return
to unanimity). Nor do unanimity's proponents seem to mind if a first
jury hangs leading to a re-trial that then convicts unanimously: the
final tally in such a case cannot be considered unanimous-but no
advocate of unanimity truly feels that the ultimate supermajoritarian
result is illegitimate. Finally, the phenomenon of the hung jury-
beyond the financial and resource inefficiencies it costs the criminal
justice system-can also be thought to exact legitimacy costs;
supermajoritarian rules (especially with the relaxed acquittal decision
rule I endorse) will cut back on hung juries and bring more repose to
the accused in our society.
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Quite apart from the results a decision rule produces in the way
of verdicts, however, one can reasonably be concerned with the
quality of deliberation that would take place under a given decision
rule. And the empirical evidence, while not univocal, suggests that
unanimity conduces to better (i.e., longer and more satisfying)
deliberation-with jurors feeling better about themselves and their
fellow citizens-under unanimity than under less exacting decision
rules. It is certainly possible that deliberation could suffer under a
relaxed rule.
Two possible replies: First, one could simply have courts adopt a
policy of refusing to accept any verdict in the first few hours of
deliberation, counteracting the propensity supermajorities might have
to get their required vote tallies and pack it in. By refusing to
consider verdicts before 4 hours of deliberation transpires, for
example, courts can more or less encourage higher quality
deliberation. This is effectively what the British did when they
relaxed their unanimity requirement in 1967. Second, we can also
stimulate deliberation by simultaneously relaxing the acquittal
decision rule, as I've recommend here. Assuming a supermajority for
conviction from the beginning of deliberation, the superminority for
acquittal may disengage if they see no hope of turning the tide.
Under a majority acquittal rule, however, the superminority will be
encouraged to engage because their preferred verdict seems much
more attainable. That engagement can lead to higher quality
deliberation.
One final point: Some may be opposed to a supermajority
conviction rule because those in the superminority-who may be
members of otherwise disenfranchised minorities-might be rendered
to have "empty votes. ' ' 17 4 At least under unanimity, it could be
argued, these minorities must be heard. Under a relaxed rule, they
can more easily be ignored.
I think we must conclude that this argument oversimplifies jury
dynamics. But, more importantly, it fails to see the empowerment a
dissenting voice can offer those in the superminority. First,
supermajoritarian rules for conviction combined with majority rules
for acquittal actually render it easier for these minorities ultimately to
'win.' Far from giving minorities only empty votes, the hybrid rule
proposed here actually empowers minority jurors because it gets
them closer to their preferred verdicts. Second, even when
174. See, e.g., Taylor-Thompson, supra note 96.
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superminorities lose, being able to be 'on the record' as dissenters
actually gives them concrete voices. If the members of a headstrong
superminority could only hang a jury (as they would do under
symmetrical unanimity), no real record remains and their voices just
as easily get thwarted: the accused often either stands trial again or
pleads to a lesser offense. Finally, the feedback the government
could potentially reap from dissenters 'on the record' could help it
make better laws and better policies. Making political decisions with
the input of a pattern of juror dissents would ultimately be
empowering to the dissenters-and would make for more deliberative
policies than using public opinion polling and interest-group lobbying
alone. We are a culture that prizes dissent:"' we expect it from our
legislators and our courts-and there is no good reason not to
reinforce dissent in our criminal juries. At the very least, it is better
than a false consensus.
I hope by now that I have made out my prima facie case and that
I have responded adequately to major objections. My client-a rule
requiring a supermajority to convict and a majority to acquit for the
criminal jury-beseeches you, the jury, to take her position seriously.
While it doesn't think it can hope to convince everyone, it never
hopes for unanimity anyway.
175. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 15; Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by
Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005).
